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1 Constitutional amendments regarding EU membership 
 
1.1 Constitutional culture 
 
1.1.1 The Constitution of Luxembourg (Constitution) falls within the category of 
constitutions tending to be more ‘evolutionary’ in nature.1 Although it is clearly part of the 
positive law in force, it is at the same time considered rather a historic and political document 
than a truly normative one. It has developed over the last 200 years in response to political 
change and historic events. The country, of which its international status as a Grand Duchy, 
independence and current borders were established by international agreements (Final Act of 
the Vienna Conference in 1815 and the Treaties of London of 1839 and 1867), suffered 
through a little over 50 years of constitutional instability before it settled, in 1868, into its 
current Constitution. Although it has been revised 34 times between 1919 and 2009, 
Luxembourg’s Constitution is thus one of Europe’s oldest written constitutions remaining in 
force.2 Many of its provisions even date back to Luxembourg’s first liberal constitution of 
1848, which itself was greatly inspired by the Belgian Constitution of 1831. Its style and 
wording are thus typical of a 19th century document. 
 Consequently there is quite a difference between the written document and the ‘living 
constitution’, for instance regarding the relations between the main political organs of the 
state. A constitutional court with limited powers was established only in 1997. It does not 
have the power to invalidate legislative acts, which can only be submitted to it by ordinary 
courts through a preliminary ruling procedure.  
 Luxembourg has embarked on a process of modernising its Constitution more generally. A 
proposal to amend the Constitution deposited with the Chambre des Députés (the unicameral 
Parliament of Luxembourg, hereinafter Chambre) on 21 April 2009 (hereinafter 2009 
Revision Proposal)3 is expected to be finalised and submitted to referendum in early 2018. 
This revision will result in a widely amended and restated Constitution, to be adopted in 
accordance with the current revision procedure, continuing Luxembourg’s evolutionary 
tradition. At the time of writing (February 2016), the Revision Proposal is still being 
discussed within the Parliamentary Committee on Institutions and Constitutional 
Amendment, in the form of a revised working draft prefiguring the future Constitution of 
2018 (hereinafter Working Draft).  
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 Due to its historical relationships with the Netherlands and Belgium, Luxembourg’s 
constitutional tradition has been strongly influenced by the constitutional traditions of these 
countries. The first advisory opinion of the Conseil d’État (State Council with advisory 
powers, also highest administrative court until 1996) on the 2009 Revision Proposal makes 
frequent reference to the Belgian and Dutch Constitutions.4 
 
1.1.2 The role of the Constitution has never been subject to extensive theoretical debate in 
Luxembourg. In a very pragmatic manner, the long-standing leading handbook on the 
Constitution describes its objective as ‘to determine the constitutional basis of the state, to 
guarantee the rights and freedoms of the citizens and to organise the public powers’.5 Divided 
into 13 chapters and 125 articles, dedicated mostly to institutional and organisational aspects, 
the Constitution does not include a preamble, which could provide information about its 
leading rationale. Compared to other constitutions, the part on fundamental rights appears to 
be neglected, whereas the rules on the functioning of the state and on the exercise of the 
powers by the institutions are developed in greater detail. The Constitution of the Grand 
Duchy does not contain a special chapter on international relations; neither does it contain 
any provision on EU membership. 
 Luxembourg’s Constitution establishes the principles on which the state is based, regulates 
the powers of state organs and guarantees fundamental rights. With respect to the sovereignty 
and organisation of Luxembourg, the Constitution makes it clear that the Grand Duchy is a 
democratic, free, independent and indivisible state headed by a constitutional monarch and 
governed by a system of parliamentary democracy. Sovereignty resides in the Nation but is 
exercised by the Grand Duke in accordance with the Constitution and national law (Art. 
32(1).  
 The Constitution specifically mentions the executive, legislative and judicial branches of 
Luxembourg’s system of government, as well as the Conseil d’Etat, the main advisory organ, 
which understands its proper role as ‘guardian of the Constitution’6 and exercises a 
moderating function within the parliamentary procedure similar to that of a second chamber.  
 Although not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, the rule of law is undoubtedly 
present in Luxembourg’s constitutional system (see more in Sect 2.1.3). However, any 
perceived lack in the current Constitution is expected to be rectified in the restated 
Constitution, as the second unnumbered paragraph of Art. 2 of the 2015 Working Draft 
includes an express recognition that Luxembourg is founded on the principle of the rule of 
law and on respect for human rights.7 
 
1.2 The amendment of the Constitution in relation to the European Union 
 
1.2.1 With regard to EC/EU membership, Luxembourg has pursued a strategy of minimal 
adjustments. The Grand Duchy ratified the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC Treaty) and the Treaty instituting the European Defence Community 
(EDC Treaty) in absence of any constitutional provision on the transfer or delegation of 
powers to international organisations. Contrary to the opinion of the Government, which 
thought that the Constitution implicitly allowed such a transfer, the Conseil d’État assumed 
that the Constitution did not. Regarding at least the ECSC Treaty, the Conseil d’État believed 
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7 In absence of any official English version, all translations of the original French legal and constitutional texts 
and judgments are those of the author. 
3 
 
that ratification was possible on the basis of customary constitutional law, without however 
indicating the exact origin and content of these customary rules. It must be inferred that it had 
in mind the prior participation of Luxembourg in the Zollverein, the German Confederation 
and the Benelux Union, which had also occurred in the absence of any written constitutional 
clause. 
 For reasons of expediency, the Conseil d’État did not oppose the legislature’s approval of 
both treaties, but urged an immediate constitutional amendment to correct the perceived 
lacuna. Although the Chambre approved the ECSC Treaty on 23 June 1952 and the EDC 
Treaty on 24 April 1954, respectively, it took another two years for the necessary 
constitutional amendments to be adopted.  
 Thus, on 25 October 1956, the Constitution was amended to add Art. 49bis, which allows 
for ‘the exercise of powers reserved by the Constitution to the legislative, executive, and 
judiciary branches to be temporarily vested, by treaty, in institutions of international law’. 
Simultaneously, Art. 37 was modified to require such treaties to be approved by a law 
meeting the voting requirements established for a constitutional amendment in Art. 114. The 
regrettable wording of Art. 49bis, allowing only ‘temporary’ transfer of competences, is to be 
modified in the course of the current revision procedure. In the past this provision has always 
been construed very widely and has not hampered any ratification of subsequent EC/EU 
founding, revision or enlargement treaties. A proposal made in 2009 to introduce an entire 
new chapter on the European Union was ultimately withdrawn without debate. 
 Only two subsequent constitutional amendments have been adopted, in 1994 and 1999, to 
address Luxembourg’s obligations under the EU treaties. Nothing in the amendments refers 
explicitly to the EC, the EU or to European integration.  
 First, at the moment the Maastricht Treaty was signed and ratified, the Constitution 
explicitly reserved voting rights or candidature in national and municipal elections for 
Luxembourgers (Arts. 9 and 107). However, Art. 114 – on constitutional revision – required 
dissolution of the Chambre in order to amend the Constitution. As voting rights for EU 
citizens were not considered to be self-executing but requiring the adoption of secondary EU 
legislation and in order not to slow down the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the Conseil 
d’État opined that an immediate constitutional amendment was not obligatory. Thereafter, 
over the next two years, discussion revolved around the compatibility of the Constitution with 
the Maastricht Treaty and the adequacy of the Art. 114 amendment procedure with regard to 
European integration. Without modifying Art. 114 at that stage, Arts. 9 and 107 were finally 
amended by a revision Act of 23 December 1994, permitting the law to confer by exemption 
the right to exercise political rights on non-Luxembourg nationals. 
 Secondly, the Constitution initially reserved access to public employment to Luxembourg 
citizens (Art. 10bis(2), formerly Art. 11(2)). In the aftermath of a judgment of the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) from 2 July 1996,8 the Constitution had to be revised. 
 Following its previous and invariable case law since 1980, the ECJ indeed held that the 
general prohibition for non-Luxembourgers to work in the public service exceeded the limits 
of the exception provided for in Art. 48(4) EC. In not complying with its obligation ‘to open 
the areas in question to nationals of other Member States by restricting application of the 
nationality condition to only those posts which actually involve direct or indirect participation 
in the exercise of powers conferred by public law and duties designed to safeguard the 
general interest of the State or of other public authorities’, Luxembourg failed to fulfil its 
obligations under the Treaty. 
 In reaction to a draft revision, the Conseil d’État did not agree in the first place that a 
revision was necessary because the Constitution did not formally restrict the access of non-
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Luxembourgers to employment in the public service and, hence, would not contradict Art. 
48(4) of the (Maastricht) Treaty.  
 However, in the context of the delivery of its opinion on the bill opening the public service 
to EU-citizens, the Conseil d’État accepted the argument that this proposal would require the 
revision of Art. 10bis(2) (formerly Art. 11(2)). As a result, Art. 11(2) was then revised in 
April 1999, stating that the law determines the eligibility of non-Luxembourgers for public 
employment.9 
 
1.2.2 Until 2003, under the original rigid amendment procedure (Art. 114), there were three 
major constraints to amending the Constitution. First, the requirement to dissolve the 
Chambre after the vote of a declaration to amend nominated provisions of the Constitution 
and to re-elect the Chambre, which then had the power to amend these provisions. Secondly, 
the assent of the Grand Duke (even though this became a formality after 1919) and, thirdly, a 
positive vote from two-thirds out of a quorum of three-quarters of the 60 Members of 
Parliament (MPs) being present. This, in practice, set the required majority at 30 out of at 
least 45 members present. Consequently, the main constraint was not this so-called ‘double 
qualified majority’, but the preceding phases of the declaration to amend, i.e. the dissolution 
and re-election of the Chambre. 
 The rigidity of the initial procedure was considered to hamper the desired general overhaul 
of the Constitution as well as quick adaptations to EU requirements. All of the above-
mentioned EU-related amendments were however adopted successfully – although 
sometimes with some delay – under the initial procedure. 
 In the context of the 1994 revision, regarding the voting rights of EU citizens, there was a 
rather heated discussion of the need to change the single constitutional amendment procedure 
in favour of a so-called ‘dual’ procedure. An attempt had been made to modify the 
constitutional amendment procedure to provide for two alternative constitutional amendment 
procedures: a less rigorous (and faster) procedure for amendments needed to ensure 
conformity with treaty obligations and a more rigorous (and somewhat slower) procedure for 
all other constitutional amendments. The Conseil d’État opposed the creation of such a dual 
system, preferring to retain a single procedure. The 2003 amendment conserved the single 
process but shortened the time needed to complete the process, by discarding the requirement 
for dissolution of the Chambre between the first and second votes on a constitutional 
amendment.  
 Today any revision thus requires two consecutive votes of the Chambre by a majority of at 
least two-thirds of its members. Voting by proxy is not permitted. There must be an interval 
of at least three months between the two votes. If within two months of the first vote more 
than one quarter of the 60 members of the Chambre or 25,000 voters submit a petition, the 
text adopted at first reading is put to a referendum. In this case there is no second reading in 
the Chambre, and the revision is passed if it receives a majority of valid votes. As any 
revision of the Constitution takes the form of a law, the bills and proposals for constitutional 
reform follow the normal legislative procedure, unless otherwise specified.  
 Article 114(2) requires a majority of two-thirds of the members of the Chambre, without 
providing a quorum, but also without permitting proxy voting. Thus, the qualified majority 
required for the adoption of revision Acts was extended to two-thirds of all members of the 
House, in total 40 members. This is still a relatively high majority, maintaining the solemnity 
of constitutional revision and, thus, the rigidity of the Constitution. In practice, most revision 
Acts are adopted unanimously. Note that since the 2003 amendment, the Chambre is clearly 
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the sole holder of revision power. The ability to submit a text adopted on first reading to a 
referendum is to be regarded as a safeguard in this regard and has not yet been used. 
 In practice, the formal distinction between constitutional amendment Acts and ordinary 
legislative acts is blurred by the existence of specific acts, which can only be adopted in 
accordance with the special majority requirement of Art. 114(2). The Constitution provides 
for four such cases: ratification of treaties transferring sovereign competences (Art. 37 in 
combination with Art. 49bis); declaration of war (Art. 37); determination of the number of 
MPs to be elected in each district (Art. 51); and a nationality condition for mayors and their 
deputies (Art. 107). 
 
1.2.3 As mentioned in Sect. 1.2.1, the two EU-related amendments adopted in 1994 and 1999 
aimed to eradicate explicit conflicts between the wording of the Constitution and the 
requirements of EU law. Both can be considered as minor amendments, as they simply 
allowed the legislator to provide for the necessary adaptations allowing nationals of other 
Member States to exercise rights stemming from EU law in Luxembourg.  
 No obstacles other than the requirements of the amendment procedure have been 
encountered, and no external advice from legal scholars or experts has been sought. 
 
1.2.4 Constitutionalising Luxembourg’s EU membership has been put on the agenda by the 
opinion of the Conseil d’État of June 2012 on the pending constitutional amendment proposal 
from April 2009. Although the Grand Duchy is one of the founding states of the European 
Union, its present Constitution does not contain any reference to this membership or to its 
constitutional foundations and implications.  
 A previous parliamentary proposal made by an MP in 2009 to introduce a completely new 
chapter on the European Union has never been discussed in substance. It was withdrawn from 
the registry of the Chambre without explanation when the Committee on Institutions and 
Constitutional Amendment started working on the more general proposal of restatement of 
the Constitution in November 2009.  
 In its opinion of June 2012, the Conseil d’État recommends constitutionalising 
Luxembourg’s participation in the process of European integration via a new Art. 5. 
Furthermore, the Conseil d’État suggests further insertions: a reference to the voting rights of 
European citizens, an adoption of the ECJ’s formula with respect to access to public 
employment, and codification of the Grand Duke’s power to adopt regulations in order to 
assure compliance with the legal instruments adopted by the European Union, rather than 
proceeding by parliamentary statute. As previously mentioned, the 2009 Revision Proposal 
has yet to come to fruition, but a version thereof is expected to be approved sometime in 2016 
or 2017. 
 The Working Draft as it stands in February 2015 contains a total of five proposals for EU-
related amendments. The new Art. 5 reads: ‘The Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg participates in 
European integration. The exercise of powers of the state may be transferred to the European 
Union and to international institutions by an Act of Parliament adopted by qualified 
majority.’ Article 10, on the political rights of Luxembourg citizens, would be supplemented 
by a second paragraph stating: ‘The law organises the exercise of political rights by citizens 
of the European Union.’ Article 11 contains a reference to the ECJ’s well-established case 
law regarding access to public employment. It provides that: ‘The law determines access to 
public employment. It may reserve for Luxembourgers public employment including direct or 
indirect participation in the exercise of public authority and in the functions having as their 
object the safeguard of the general interests of the state.’ Article 49(3) allows the Grand Duke 
to ‘adopt the necessary regulations for application of the legal acts of the European Union’. 
Finally, Arts. 90 and 98 provide for the ex ante control (through consultative opinions of the 
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Conseil d’État) and ex post review (by binding decisions of the courts) of Acts of Parliament 
and regulations with regard to ‘higher law’, namely the Constitution, international treaties, 
EU legislation and the general principles of law. According to Art. 98, ‘[t]he courts shall 
apply Acts and regulations only in so far as they conform to the norms of higher law’.  
 
1.3 Conceptualising sovereignty and the limits to the transfer of powers 
 
1.3.1 Since its amendment in 1956, the Constitution authorises the temporary transfer of the 
exercise of legislative, executive and judicial powers to institutions established under 
international law (Art. 49bis). The ratification of such treaties needs to be approved by the 
Chambre following the special two-thirds majority requirement applicable to constitutional 
amendments (Art. 37).  
 The Constitution does not contain any explicit rule on the legal value of international or 
European Law within the domestic legal order. Nonetheless, according to well-settled case 
law and the position of the Conseil d’État as well as Luxembourgish scholars, self-executing 
international treaties enjoy full primacy with regard to the provisions of internal law, 
including the Constitution itself.10  
 The case law on this point was developed from the early 1950s when first the Cour de 
cassation (the highest civil court) and subsequently the Conseil d’État (as the former highest 
administrative court) reversed the previous position that judicial control of the compliance of 
Acts of Parliament with international treaties was not possible because of the principle of 
separation of powers.11 
 According to the reference decision of the Conseil d’État in 1951, ‘an international treaty 
incorporated into domestic law by a law of approval is law of superior essence having a 
higher origin than the will of an internal organ. It follows that in the case of conflict between 
the provisions of an international treaty and those of a subsequent national law, international 
law must prevail over national law’.12  
 The wording of this decision is clearly very wide, as the judgment states without 
distinction that an international norm prevails over the will of any internal organ. It will be 
noted, however, that in 1956 the Chambre expressly rejected a governmental constitutional 
amendment bill, which provided that ‘[t]he rules of international law are part of the national 
legal order. They supersede all other law and national provisions’. According to this draft, 
primacy would have encompassed constitutional provisions.  
 The Conseil d’État, however, implicitly accepted such a general primacy in an opinion of 
26 May 1992 on the draft Act Approving the EU Treaty. Indeed, it considered that  
 
it should be borne in mind that under the rule of the hierarchy of legal norms, international law takes 
precedence before national law and, in the case of conflict, the courts shall dismiss domestic law in favour 
of the Treaty. As it is important to avoid a contradiction between national law and international law, the 
Conseil d’État insists that the related constitutional amendment take place within due time to prevent such 
a situation of incompatibility. 
 
 In the case of conflict of an international or European engagement with the Constitution or 
legislative acts, national standards should be subject to a constitutional revision or 
amendment before the international commitment is approved by the competent national 
                                                
10 Kinsch 2010, p. 399. 
11 Cour de cassation, arrêts des 8 juin 1950, Pasicrisie lux. 15, p. 41, et 14 juillet 1954, Chambre des métiers c. 
Pagani, Pasicrisie lux. 16, p. 151; JT 1954, p. 694, note Pescatore 1962. 
12 Conseil d’Etat, (Comité du contentieux), 28 juillet 1951, Dieudonné c/ Administration des contributions, Pas. 
lux. t. XV, p. 263.  
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authorities. Once approved, the respective international norms enjoy, in the pure monistic 
tradition, full primacy over rules of domestic law, even of constitutional value.13 
 This rule also applies to the secondary legislation of the European Union.14 All (civil and 
administrative) courts have accepted the full supremacy and direct effect of EU law in the 
very terms of the ECJ’s case law, to which they regularly refer.  
 Acts of the Chambre approving international treaties are explicitly excluded from the 
competence of the Constitutional Court (Art. 95ter(2)). In Luxembourg, this is considered as 
a consequence of the primacy of international treaties. In effect this means that cases such as 
Lisbon and ESM in Germany cannot arise in Luxembourg. Acts of the Chambre transposing 
or executing obligations deriving from secondary EU legislation are not explicitly excluded 
from the Constitutional Court’s competence. Until now, no such Act has however been 
submitted to the Constitutional Court as a preliminary question by an ordinary court. The 
opinion seems to prevail that the ‘immunity’ of Acts approving treaties also covers Acts 
implementing secondary EU legislation.  
 
1.3.2 Luxembourg’s Constitution has never been based on a conception of absolute 
sovereignty. In the absence of any clause on the transfer or delegation of sovereignty, the 
Conseil d’État stated already in 1952 that ‘a state may and must renounce certain parts of its 
sovereignty if the public good, the ultimate purpose of the state’s organisation, requires it’.15 
As the Constitutional Court may not review the constitutionality of Acts approving 
international treaties, there is no pertinent case law from this court. 
 One of the particular characteristics of Luxembourg’s domestic legal order lies in the fact 
that its very existence results from international law. Established as an independent state by 
the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna of 9 June 1815, the Grand Duchy’s independence 
was confirmed by the Treaties of London of 19 April 1839 and 11 May 1867. Therefore, far 
from constituting a threat to national sovereignty, international law is understood in 
Luxembourg as a ‘vital guarantee of the existence and survival of the state’.16 Moreover, 
Luxembourg’s courts have had no difficulty in recognising the pre-eminence of international 
law and the primacy of EU law, including in respect of a constitutional provision.17 This state 
of affairs also explains why it was not considered necessary to write a provision into the 
Constitution that would more explicitly authorise transfers of competences to the Union. 
 In Luxembourg, the Constitution long ago ceased to be the only supreme law. At the time 
of ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, some criticised the ‘suspension’ of the Constitution 
which occurred, in that ratification of the Treaty took place before the constitutional 
amendment giving citizens of the Union the right to vote in municipal elections.18 There is 
now a consensus about the existence of a set of norms ranked as supra-legislative and 
designated by the term ‘higher law’, comprising the Constitution, international law and the 
general principles of law. It is within the remit of the Conseil d’État to monitor the 
compliance of draft bills and draft regulations with these rules of higher law. The amended 
Act of 12 July 1996, reforming the Conseil d’État, states in its Art. 2(2) that ‘[i]f it considers 
a draft bill to be contrary to the Constitution, to international agreements and treaties, or to 
                                                
13 Cour d’appel, arrêt du 13 novembre 2001, No. 396/01 V, Annales du droit luxembourgeois, 2002, éd. 
Bruylant, p. 456. Cour supérieure de justice (assemblée générale), arrêt du 5 décembre 2002, No. 337/02, 
Annales du droit luxembourgeois, 2003, éd. Bruylant, p. 683. 
14 Conseil d’Etat, 21 novembre 1984, Pasicrisie lux. 26, p. 174. 
15 Opinion on the Ratification of the ECSC Treaty, doc. parl. No. 395/2, p. 3. 
16 Cf. Wiveness 2002, p. 267 et seq.. 
17 Cf. Pescatore 1962, p. 97 et seq., Wiveness 2002 p. 21, Kinsch 2010, p. 399. 
18 Cf. Bonn 1992. 
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the general principles of law, the Conseil d’État shall state this in its Opinion. It shall do the 
same, if it considers a draft regulation to be contrary to a rule of higher law’.  
 
1.3.3 There are no limits ratione materiae with regard to the extent to which powers can be 
transferred to the EU, as there are no such limits to constitutional amendments in general. 
Neither the text of the Constitution nor case law nor constitutional commentary refer to such 
limits under Luxembourgish law. 
 The Grand Duchy is an ‘independent’ state (Art. 1). The same statement appeared in the 
previous constitutional texts of 1848 and 1856. These earlier constitutions, however, very 
clearly put this independence into perspective by going on to declare that Luxembourg was 
‘part of the German Confederation’. The 1856 text went even further by stating that the 
Grand Duchy ‘participates in the rights and obligations arising from the Federal Constitution. 
These rights and these obligations cannot be derogated by the internal legislation of the 
country’.  
 Be it a matter of the past within the German Confederation or of the present within 
European integration, the constitutional proclamation of independence has never stopped the 
Grand Duchy from participating in integration exercises with a constitutional dimension. 
Moreover, at no time has the preservation of the independence of the state ever been seriously 
discussed as a possible limit to Luxembourg’s participation in the European integration 
process.19  
 Its successive incorporation in the German Confederation (1815–1866), the ‘Zollverein’ 
(1842–1918), the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union (from 1921) and the Benelux Union 
(from 1944) have, on the contrary, enabled Luxembourg to acquire indispensable experience 
for being prepared for the legal implications of its membership of the European Communities 
and Union. 
 The unfortunate wording of Art. 49bis allowing transfers of such powers to international 
institutions only temporarily has been interpreted very widely and has not in practice 
prevented any transfer of competencies to the EC or the EU, which are known to be based on 
treaties concluded for unlimited duration.  
 Article 5 of the pending Working Draft will thus remove this inconsistency, stating: ‘The 
exercise of state powers can be transferred to the European Union and international 
institutions by a law adopted by qualified majority.’ 
 
1.3.4 The Constitution is silent about its status as supreme law in the national legal system. 
The Constitutional Court can be asked through preliminary questions from the ordinary 
courts to review the constitutionality of legislative acts (Art. 95ter). However, its judgments 
have only declaratory value. An Act declared contrary to an article of the Constitution will 
have to be set aside by the ordinary court that raised the question and all other courts that 
intervene in the same case. It will, however, remain in force unless the Chambre adopts an 
Act to modify or abrogate it. In practice, the Chambre has decided in several such cases to 
amend the Constitution in order to abolish the inconsistency, rather than to modify the 
legislative act. Finally, as a consequence of the supremacy of the Constitution, none of its 
provisions may be suspended (Art. 113). 
 Legislative acts approving international treaties are explicitly excluded from the 
competence of the Constitutional Court (Art. 95ter (2)). This is understood in Luxembourg as 
a consequence of the primacy of international law.  
 More than an EU-friendly interpretation, the Luxembourgish courts have adopted an 
attitude of deference towards international law in general and EU law in particular, often 
                                                
19 Cf. Wiveness 2002, p. 267 et seq. 
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echoing the case law of the ECJ word for word. Indeed, since the 1950s they have confirmed 
that international treaties enjoy primacy over domestic law because they are considered as 
higher law in essence.  
 
1.4 Democratic control 
 
1.4.1 Luxembourg’s Constitution does not contain specific amendments concerning the rules 
governing the participation of the Chambre in EU affairs. Although Prime Minister Juncker 
suggested such an amendment in the course of the ratification procedure of the Lisbon Treaty 
in 2009, the Chambre did not accept his proposal. It allegedly feared that it was not 
sufficiently staffed to face this responsibility. 
 Thus it is a simple ‘Memorandum on Cooperation between the Chambre and the 
Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg in the Field of EU Policy’, which is 
annexed to the rules of procedure of the Chambre, that governs the rights and duties of both 
institutions in this respect.20 Introduced on 7 May 2009, this memorandum contains in 
particular rules on the right of the Chambre to be informed on issues of European policy.  
 The Lisbon Treaty recognises the right of national parliaments to contribute actively to the 
good functioning of the Union (Art. 12 TEU). From the review of official documents of the 
European institutions to the transposition of directives into national law, the action of the 
Chambre in the political sphere of the European Union is thus manifold.  
 National parliaments are indeed involved by monitoring the activity of their respective 
national governments on the European level. In the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, a 
parliamentary committee invites the ministers to its sessions before and after Council 
meetings.  
 The Chambre contributes to the monitoring of respect of the subsidiarity principle laid 
down in the Treaty of Lisbon.21 Beyond these two main powers, the Chambre participates in 
inter-parliamentary cooperation within the Union. Inter-parliamentary meetings are held 
mainly within the framework of the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union 
Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC) and the Conference of Presidents of 
Parliaments of the European Union. Information on the analysis of EU documents is 
transmitted between national parliaments through the platform for EU Interparliamentary 
Exchange (IPEX) database. 
 The control exercised by the Chambre over the Government in the field of European 
affairs appears altogether rather modest compared to practices in other Member States. There 
are no elements of this control that merit recommendation more widely as a best practice. 
 
1.4.2 Direct democracy only plays a limited role in Luxembourg’s parliamentary system. 
Introduced in 1919 for legislative matters (Art. 51(7)) and in 2003 for constitutional 
amendments (Art. 114), referendums have only been organised three times: in 1919 on the 
dynastic question and on economic union to be concluded with France or Belgium; in 1937 
on a bill allowing dissolution of the Communist party; and in 2005 on the Treaty establishing 
a Constitution for Europe. An Act of 4 February 2005 lays down the more detailed rules on 
the organisation of referendums.22  
 The very first referendum on constitutional amendment will most likely be organised in 
early 2018 on the currently pending Revision Proposal. On 7 June 2015, three questions 
                                                
20 Aide-mémoire sur la coopération entre la Chambre des députés et le Gouvernement du Grand-Duché de 
Luxembourg en matière de politique européenne. 
21 See Gennart 2013. 
22 Loi du 4 février 2005 relative au referendum au niveau national, Memorial A, n° 27 of 3 March 2005, p. 548. 
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regarding the debated elements of the future Constitution have been put to a consultative 
referendum. One question related to granting voting rights to foreign residents in national 
elections. The two others were on reducing the minimum age of voting and limiting the 
duration of ministerial mandates. All three proposals have been rejected. 
 The only referendum related to EU matters was held on 10 July 2005 on the ratification of 
the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.23 As a result, 56.52% of the voters said 
‘Yes’. Luxembourg is indeed regarded as one of the EU’s most enthusiastic Member States, 
and most prominent political figures supported the Constitution for Europe, with both the 
governing coalition and the main opposition parties campaigning for a ‘Yes’ vote. On 28 
June 2005, the Chambre had already approved the ratification of the treaty at its first reading. 
The poll was consultative in nature, but Parliament agreed to abide by the people’s majority 
vote. The then Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker said he would resign if the referendum 
resulted in a ‘No’ vote.  
 In connection with this referendum, the question arose whether EU citizens other than 
Luxembourgish citizens should be allowed to vote, which was finally decided in the 
negative.24 The statement of reasons of the Act on the basis of which the referendum was 
organised does not refer to any specific rationale as to the constitutional procedure chosen to 
approve the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. However, the draft Act concerning 
this referendum notes that:  
 
While the referendum is, from the legal point of view, of advisory character, the legislature will 
nevertheless feel politically bound by the popular verdict. Therefore, it is necessary to measure the 
challenges raised by the consultation to be held on 10 July 2005. Due to the exceptional nature of 
referendums in our history, the results will leave a lasting imprint on the political life of our country. 
 
1.5 The reasons for, and the role of, EU-amendments 
 
1.5.1 As mentioned above (Sect. 1.2.1), EU-related amendments have been limited to the 
strictly necessary in order to overcome constitutional provisions that had become contrary to 
EU law achievements: namely the right of workers from other Member States to have access 
to employment (Art. 45 TFEU) and the right of citizens of the EU to vote and to stand as a 
candidate in European Parliament and municipal elections. 
 
1.5.2 The absence of EU-amendments is characteristic for such a very small Member State, 
founded by international treaties and in which integration into the EU is perceived as a 
question of national interest.  
 The rigidity of the initial constitutional revision procedure certainly dissuaded 
Luxembourg from passing constitutional amendments that were not considered absolutely 
necessary. Twice, in the 1950s and in the 1990s, Luxembourg tolerated what were most 
likely unconstitutional treaty ratifications in order not to slow down the entry into effect of 
the ECSC and Maastricht treaties. A prior constitutional amendment would indeed have 
required the dissolution and re-election of the Chambre.  
 Luxembourg’s constitutional culture, which may be summarised as pragmatic and 
somewhat deferent to international and European law, also explains to some extent the 
sentiment that EU-related amendments are superfluous. In addition, the level of public 
                                                
23 La loi du 14 avril 2005 portant organisation d’un referendum national sur Traité établissant une Constitution 
pour l’Europe, signé à Rome, le 29 octobre 2004. For discussion concerning this referendum see Dumont et al. 
2012. 
24 P. 3 of the Projet de loi portant organisation d'un référendum national sur le Traité établissant une 
Constitution pour l'Europe, signé à Rome, le 29 octobre 2004, parl. doc. No. 5443. 
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support for the EU has always been one of the highest throughout the Union and is shared by 
all political parties in Parliament. European integration has never been conceptualised in 
Luxembourg as a threat to constitutional rules, principles or values. Thus, only constitutional 
rules that have become explicitly contrary to requirements of EU law have been amended. 
 In the past, several scholars have underlined the fact that the current Constitution has to 
some extent become obsolete and urgently needs to be adapted in order to eradicate all the 
‘fictions’ stemming from a wide difference between the old written document and the current 
constitutional practice.25 It was not, however, until the advisory opinion of the Conseil d’État 
of June 2012 on the pending Revision Proposal that the introduction of EU related 
amendments were put on the agenda. The initial revision proposal as tabled in April 2009 by 
the Committee on Institutions and Constitutional Amendment only addressed internal 
constitutional issues.  
 Concerns with regard to ‘waning constitutionalism’ that have indeed been expressed in 
Luxembourg were in fact never linked to missing EU clauses but to the growing difference 
between the text and practice of the Constitution. As direct effect and primacy of EU law 
have never been put into question in the Grand Duchy, it was rather argued that the 
introduction of specific constitutional clauses with regard to the EU was unnecessary. 
 
1.5.3 Within the EU, the far-reaching exercise of powers at supranational level requires a set 
of constitutional rules ensuring that these powers are exercised according to shared 
constitutional values and in the respect of a common standard of fundamental rights. This set 
of rules can only result from ‘European constitutional law’ understood here as a combination 
of the Member States’ national constitutions, the ‘EU constitution’, the ECHR and the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. The harmonious coexistence of these different 
legal sources and their complementary relation needs to be organised by clauses of reciprocal 
reference and mutual respect. In this understanding, ‘Europe clauses’ in the national 
constitutions have an important role to play, as it is shown for instance by Art. 23 of the 
German Basic Law. It is important to amend the national constitution in order to contribute to 
ensuring that the exercise of delegated powers on the Union level observes the same 
standards as exercise on the national level. Amendments should at least include a general 
clause on membership within the EU, a clause on the transfer of powers and its limits and a 
clause on the participation of the national parliament in EU affairs. 
 Luxembourg’s experience as one of the founding members shows, however, that it is also 
possible to participate successfully in the process of European integration for more than sixty 
years without any amendment of the Constitution referring explicitly to the EU or EU law 
and on the foundation of a constitutional provision that allows only temporary delegation of 
powers to international institutions. The absence of a Europe clause has never been 
considered as a lacuna endangering constitutional values or fundamental rights standards. The 
intended amendments within the current revision procedure are rather seen as a commitment 
to European integration and an overdue adaptation of the Constitution to the legal reality. 
 
2 Constitutional rights, the rule of law and EU law 
 
2.1 The position of constitutional rights and the rule of law in the Constitution 
 
2.1.1 The Constitution contains Chapter II ‘On public freedoms and fundamental rights’ 
(Arts. 9 to 31). This chapter has been construed progressively through different constitutional 
                                                




amendments. It is relatively brief and combines different types of safeguards (acquisition of 
citizenship, human rights, political rights, economic and social rights) without, however, 
embracing a clear structure. Some widely recognised principles such as a general prohibition 
of discrimination or a general requirement of fair trial are missing. On the whole, compared 
to other domestic constitutional or international documents dealing with fundamental rights, 
Chapter II of the Luxembourgish Constitution appears fragmentary.  
 The general principles referred to above are not expressed as such, although the principle 
of legal certainty transpires through several specific constitutional safeguards such as the 
right to a judge, the principle nulla poena sine lege and the prohibition of unlawful 
expropriation. Moreover, the principle of proportionality is anchored in the current draft of 
the 2009 Revision Proposal as one of the parameters to be taken into account when 
restrictions to fundamental freedoms are envisaged.26 
 The 2009 Revision Proposal appears more ambitious, as it introduces a wider range of 
safeguards and their better organisation. Having said that, while the suggested changes to the 
organisation have been inspired by the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union27 (Charter), this draft has been already criticised because some safeguards that are 
typically anchored in international human rights instruments are missing.28 
 The most relevant fundamental rights and public freedoms are discussed in Sects. 2.3–2.5. 
 The judicial enforcement of the constitutional safeguards is primarily a matter for the 
domestic ordinary courts, as opposed to the Constitutional Court, the competence29 (and 
history30) of which are rather limited compared to other European constitutional courts. It can 
only review Acts of Parliament upon a preliminary request made, in a given proceeding, by 
an ordinary court. Private parties are not allowed to file individual complaints. Moreover, the 
Constitutional Court has not been endowed with the competence to assess the relation 
between the Constitution and international law, including such instruments as the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). In this 
respect also it was for the ordinary courts to set the standard, which they did when the Cour 
d’appel (Court of Appeal) confirmed that the ECHR takes precedence over domestic rules, 
including the Constitution.31 
 Within its limited scope of action, the Constitutional Court has ‘progressively’ interpreted 
Art. 14 of the Constitution in particular32 and extended the narrowly drafted principle of 
equality beyond the text of the Constitution: while the text of the Constitution reserves this 
principle for Luxembourgish citizens only, the Constitutional Court has extended it to 
                                                
26 See above Sect. 2.1.2. 
27 See the explanatory memorandum to the initial draft of the Constitution revision: ‘For Chapter 2 on civil 
liberties and fundamental rights, the Commission on Institutions and Constitutional Revision proposes a new 
structure arranged like the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, around the terms dignity, 
equality and freedom. The guarantees in the social and economic field as well as in the environment, and the 
rights that citizens can claim when facing the public administration are organized under the terms solidarity and 
citizenship’. Doc. parl. No. 6030, p. 6.  
28 See Spielmann 2011, p. 582, referring to the opinion of the Commission européenne pour la démocratie par le 
droit (Commission de Venise), opinion No. 544/2009, CDL-AD(2009)059. 
29 See Gerkrath 2008, p. 9. 
30 The Luxembourgish Constitutional Court started its work in 1998, and as of February 2015 has issued 116 
judgments.  
31 CSJ (appel corr.), 13 November 2001, No. 396/01, see Friden and Kinsch 2001. On the relation between the 
Luxembourgish Constitutional Court and the ECHR, see Ravarani 2001, pp. 37–42. 
32 Spielmann 2011, p. 578 and p. 583. For the interpretation of Art. 14 of the Constitution, see judgments of the 
Constitutional Court, No. 12/02 of 22 March 2002, Mém. A - 40 of 12 April 2002, p. 672; (on this judgment see 
Braum 2008, p. 77); No. 23/04 and 24/04 of 3 December 2004, Mém. A - 201 of 23 December 2004, p. 2960; 
No. 41/07, 42/07 and 43/07 of 14 December 2007, Mém. A - 1 of 11 January 2008, pp. 2–8. 
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foreigners,33 holding that the principle of equality ‘is applicable to each individual concerned 
by Luxembourgish law, if rights or personality are concerned’.34 On the other hand, 
commentators have noted the restrictive approach embraced by the same Constitutional Court 
in respect of citizenship (nationalité). According to some, this case law is at odds with the 
approach embraced by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).35 
 As the constitutional restatement intends to abolish the existing Constitutional Court, it 
will be up to a new supreme court to ultimately decide on the conformity of Acts of 
Parliament with the Constitution and international treaties. Provisions that are declared 
contrary to the Constitution or international treaties would then become invalid after the 
publication of the judgment (Art. 98(2)). The main reason for abolishing the Constitutional 
Court seems to be the wish to unify the judicial system under one Supreme Court and the 
resulting possibility for that court to merge review of conformity with international treaties 
and review of conformity with the Constitution. 
 
2.1.2 The Constitution does not foresee a provision equivalent to Art. 31(3) of the Polish 
Constitution. However, the latest Constitutional Working Draft contains a new disposition 
which reads as follows: 
  
Any limitation on the exercise of fundamental rights, civil liberties and the rights of the person subject to 
legal proceedings as provided for by the Constitution must respect their essential content. In accordance 
with the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary in a democratic 
society, and genuinely meet objectives of general interest or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of 
others. 
 
 Concerning limitations to the principle of equality (Art. 10bis) by legislative acts, the 
Constitutional Court has developed a specific doctrine. According to its jurisprudence, 
legislative acts may submit certain categories of persons to different legal regimes as far as 
this difference proceeds from objective disparities, is rationally justified, adequate and 
proportionate to its aim. This formulation will be codified within Art. 16 of the Constitutional 
Working Draft. 
 
2.1.3 The concept of the rule of law does not appear as such in the text of the Constitution. As 
noted above, the Constitution nevertheless contains specific expressions of the principle of 
legality, such as safeguards in the context of criminal proceedings (Arts. 12 to 14), and the 
prohibition of expropriation without statutory basis, fair compensation and for reasons other 
than for a public cause (Art. 16). 
 The notion of the rule of law (État de droit) appears in the current Working Draft which 
foresees the following new wording of Art. 2 of the Constitution: ‘[Luxembourg] is based on 
the principles of the rule of law and respect for human rights.’36  
 Article 13 of the Constitution guarantees the right of a person not to be reassigned, against 
the person’s will, to a court other than that designated by law. Article 86 of the Constitution 
spells out another aspect of the regular administration of justice by foreseeing that no court 
can be established otherwise than by law, and by prohibiting the establishment of 
extraordinary courts. 
                                                
33 Cour constitutionnelle, 13 November 1998, No. 2/98. 
34 See also the judgment of the Appeal Court (4th ch.) of 6 November 2013: ‘[T]he constitutional principle of 
equality is applicable to all individuals affected by Luxembourgish law, and violation of this principle can be 
raised by a foreigner.’ For a comment see Kinsch 2014, pp. 84–85. 
35 Spielmann 2011, p. 585. 
36 See in this respect Ergec 2009, pp. 180–184. 
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 As regards the enforcement of constitutionally guaranteed rights, it should be noted that 
private parties do not have direct access to the Constitutional Court. However, the ordinary 
courts have the possibility to seize the Constitutional Court with a preliminary ruling request 
concerning the constitutionality of an Act to be applied in the pending proceedings. More 
specifically, when a party raises a question as to the conformity of a law with the Constitution 
before a court, the latter has to seize the Constitutional Court unless it considers that a 
decision on such a question is not necessary, the question is unfounded or that the 
Constitutional Court has already ruled on it.37 
 Also, ‘[c]ourts and tribunals may apply general and local decisions and regulations only in 
so far as these comply with the laws’ (Art. 95). The notion of ‘laws’ has been given a broad 
meaning, encompassing also the domestic Constitution and international treaties.38 In this 
way, the ordinary courts can reach out to the constitutional safeguards as well as to 
international safeguards related to fundamental rights, with the latter taking precedence over 
the former. 
 The rule that only published laws can be valid is anchored in the Constitution: ‘Any law, 
order or regulation of general or municipal administration is not binding until it has been 
published in the form determined by law’ (Art. 112). Further details on the requirement of 
publication of laws are provided in Sect. 2.5.  
 The principles of legal certainty and non-retroactivity, and the principle of nulla poena 
sine lege are anchored in Arts. 12 and 14 of the Constitution. However, these provisions do 
not explicitly contain some of the specific aspects of these principles mentioned above, such 
as the applicability of these principles to administrative matters or a general prohibition of 
retroactivity. 
 
2.2 The balancing of fundamental rights and economic freedoms in EU law 
 
2.2.1 The balancing of fundamental rights with economic free movement rights has not 
raised any constitutional issues in Luxembourg to date. No relevant case law has been 
developed on this question before or after the ECJ’s judgments in Schmidberger and 
Omega.39 In the Expert’s view, the domestic courts would give precedence to free movement 
rights guaranteed by the EU treaties over fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution 
unless consistent interpretation were possible.  
 
2.3 Constitutional rights, the European Arrest Warrant and EU criminal law 
2.3.1 The EAW and the presumption of innocence 
 
2.3.1.1 The European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision40 (EAWFD) was introduced in 
Luxembourg by virtue of the Loi du 17 mars 2004 relative au mandat d’arrêt européen et 
aux procédures de remise entre États membres de l’Union européenne (Act of 17 March 
2004), published in Mémorial A n° 39 of 22 March 2004, and modified later with the Loi du 
3 août 2011 (the Act of 3 August 2011).  
                                                
37 See Article 95ter of the Luxembourgish Constitution and Act dated 27 July 1997 portant organisation de la 
Cour Constitutionnelle (creating the Constitutional Court). 
38 Cour adm. 8 December 2011, No. 28818 C. 
39 Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-05659 and Case C-36/02 Omega [2004] ECR I-09609.  
40 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures 
between Member States (2002/584/JHA), [2002] OJ L 190/1. 
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 The Conseil d’État is considered to be the ‘Guardian of the Constitution’ with an advisory 
function to control a priori all proposals and bills referred to it by the Grand Duke and the 
Government. As an advisory organ, the Conseil d’État was called to give its Opinion 
regarding the compatibility of the EAWFD bill with the ‘norms of higher law’, that is, the 
Constitution, international treaties and the general principles of law.41  
 No specific references or concerns regarding the principle of the presumption of innocence 
are found in the Opinion. Neither have the national courts had the opportunity to address this 
principle in the context of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW). According to the legal 
commentary, the principle of the presumption of innocence constitutes a general principle of 
Luxembourgish law, which draws its content from Art. 6(2) ECHR and Art. 14(2) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.42  
 There is considerable discussion in the Opinion on the nature of the legal instrument (a 
framework decision) which was selected to address and regulate, on the EU level, an issue 
closely linked to the exercise of state sovereignty. Specifically, the Conseil d’État considered 
whether the EAWFD would affect Luxembourg’s international obligations under other 
international treaties on extradition. After examining the relevant provisions, the Conseil 
d’État concluded that there is no incompatibility between them and the EAWFD.43  
 According to the Conseil d’État, the EAWFD does not raise any difficulties in 
Luxembourg’s constitutional order, because the Framework Decision was adopted by 
unanimity and had no binding effect until it was transposed into national law.44 The legal 
instrument of the EAWFD is justified for a number of reasons: it is of a general nature and 
does not seek to introduce a specific procedure for prosecuting certain forms of criminality; 
the objective of creating a European area of justice imposes the obligation to reduce obstacles 
to cooperation on criminal investigations or the enforcement of penalties between the judicial 
authorities of Member States as much as possible. Even though the EAWFD may resemble a 
EU directive, it still constitutes an instrument of intergovernmental cooperation.  
 The Conseil d’État has emphasised the traditional character of extradition requests 
between sovereign states and underscored the special interest that a country of the size of 
Luxembourg has in the issue of extradition. It is not surprising that extradition was the 
subject of an early domestic Act incorporating the provisions of international treaties on 
extradition. Luxembourg was among the states to sign and ratify the European Convention on 
Extradition of 13 December 1957, and the Benelux Treaty on Extradition and Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters of 27 June 1962.  
 Following this tradition, the Conseil d’État is of the view that the simplification of the 
rules and procedures on the extradition mechanism is compatible with the efforts on the 
European level to intensify the collaboration between Member States. The Conseil d’État 
recognises, however, that the EAWFD has caused a rupture between the extradition law 
based on international conventions and the new European area of justice.45 It is no longer the 
executive organs that decide whether it is appropriate to grant an extradition request, but the 
judicial authorities that decide to extradite a person by applying a European arrest warrant. 
The Government, through the Ministry of Justice, intervenes only when there is a conflict 
between a European arrest warrant and a request for extradition by a third state.  
 The relevant constitutional provisions are the following: ‘No one may be prosecuted 
except in the cases specified by the law and according to the prescribed procedure. No one 
may be arrested or detained except in the cases specified by the law and according to the 
                                                
41 Opinion Conseil d’État of 19 December 2003, doc. parl. No. 5104/1. 
42 Penning 2013, p. 103.  
43 Opinion No. 5104/1, n. 41, p. 3  
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., p. 2 
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prescribed procedure. Every person must be informed without delay of the means of legal 
recourse they have at their disposal to recover their freedom’ (Art. 12). ‘No one may be 
deprived against his will of the judge that the law assigns to him’ (Art. 13). ‘No penalty may 
be established or applied except by virtue of the law’ (Art 14).  
 According to the 2009 Revision Proposal, the new relevant provisions introduce some 
minor additional safeguards to the aforementioned articles. According to Arts. 18, 19 and 20 
of the new draft, no one may be prosecuted, arrested or deprived of his liberty except in the 
cases provided by law and in the form prescribed. No one can be arrested except by a 
reasoned order of a court, which must be served at the time of the arrest or at the latest within 
24 hours. Everyone shall be informed promptly of the reasons for his arrest or deprivation of 
liberty, the charges against him and the legal remedies available to regain their freedom. 
Everyone has the right to have his case brought before a court established by law. No penalty 
may be established or applied except by virtue of the law. 
 Finally, it is worth mentioning that the Act of 17 March 2004, which transposed the 
EAWFD in Luxembourg, provides in Art. 18 that if the issuing authorities intend to prosecute 
the surrendered person for an offence committed prior to his or her surrender, other than that 
for which he or she was surrendered, they are obliged to submit a request for consent to the 
Luxembourgish authorities. Consequently, Luxembourg preserved its entitlement to the 
‘speciality’ rule referred to in Art. 27, and no consent on behalf of Luxembourg can be 
presumed if the surrendered person is prosecuted (or sentenced or detained) for an offence 
other than the offence providing grounds for the EAW.  
 
2.3.1.2 Because of the general character of the crimes listed in the EAWFD, the Conseil 
d’État, quoting the example of the Belgian legislator, proposed in its Opinion that the judicial 
authorities in Luxembourg, upon receiving a European arrest warrant, should exercise a 
judicial review in order to assess whether the facts of the case fall within the definition of the 
crimes listed in the EAWFD. 
 However, the Legal Committee of the Parliament decided not to follow the suggestion of 
the Conseil d’État.46 The reasoning was that such a judicial review, provided in law, might be 
interpreted by the courts as a thorough and substantial judicial review of an extradition 
request.47 According to the Committee’s reasoning, even if the law does not expressly 
provide for a judicial review, the judicial authorities in Luxembourg would still exercise 
some kind of judicial review. The exercise of such judicial review would not provoke any 
difficulties, because the general concepts of the crimes listed in the EAWFD are already 
recognised and have a common connotation in Luxembourgish law. The Parliamentary 
Committee underlined that in any case, the judicial authorities in Luxembourg would still 
have the possibility to submit a request for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the 
EU, in case of difficulties in interpretation.  
 Article 7 of the Act of 17 March 2004 provides for the procedure for execution of an 
EAW. When the requested person is arrested, the executing judicial authority shall inform the 
person of the European arrest warrant and of its contents, of the possibility of consenting to 
surrender to the issuing judicial authority and also of his or her right to be assisted by legal 
counsel and by an interpreter, if necessary. Within 24 hours of his or her arrest, the requested 
person is brought before a judge, who controls the person’s identity. A hearing takes place on 
the issue of detention, where the judge takes into consideration both the facts mentioned in 
the EAW and the person’s statements. The requested person may at any time submit a request 
for his or her release to the Chambre du Conseil du tribunal d’arrondissement. The latter 
                                                
46 Rapport no 5104/4 de la Commission Juridique de la Chambre des Députés of 3 March 2004, hereinafter the 
‘Report’. 
47 Ibid., p. 7. 
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shall order his or her release only if the procedure of arrest has been irregular, and this 
irregularity has brought about a grave violation of his or her human rights, or if there are 
safeguards from which the requested person will not benefit if surrendered to the issuing 
state. 
 According to the Premier Avocat Général of the Parquet Général (Luxembourg), the role 
of the executing judicial authorities is not to deliver a judgment on the innocence of the 
requested person, but to apply the Act of 17 March 2004 and review whether all the legal 
requirements have been met for his or her surrender after the issue of an EAW.48 The review 
does not constitute a review of evidence but a review of the legal conditions for the 
applicability of the law.  
 According to research conducted by the Service of Legal Documentation of the Parquet 
General (Public Prosecutor’s Office) in Luxembourg, as at 26 January 2015 there have been 
five cases brought before the Tribunal d’ Arrondissement de Luxembourg (District Court) 
regarding extradition requests in the context of the EAWFD. None of them have involved a 
claim of innocence by the arrested person.   
 There was one case in which the Procureur General d’État (Attorney General of the 
State), by virtue of Art. 5(6) of the Act of 17 March 2004, refused to extradite a person who 
was born in Luxembourg because execution of the sentence in Luxembourg was deemed 
more appropriate given the person’s links to Luxembourg.49 In another case, the arrested 
person resorted to the Luxembourghish court claiming health reasons in order to avoid 
extradition to another Member State. The claim was not accepted by the court, as health 
reasons do not constitute a legal obstacle to extradition under the EAWFD regime.50  
 
2.3.2 Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege 
 
2.3.2.1 In its Opinion on the bill transposing the EAWFD in Luxembourg, the Conseil d’État 
clearly stated that the abolition of the rule of double criminality in the context of the EAWFD 
would not affect the principle of legality of crimes. According to the Opinion, even if the act 
committed within the territory of the issuing state may not constitute a criminal offence in the 
state being asked to execute the extradition, the criminal prosecution of the perpetrator does 
not violate the principle of nullum crimen sine lege (or the principle of nulla poena sine lege 
in the case of a European arrest warrant for enforcement of a custodial sentence), because of 
the principle of territoriality of criminal law. The reasoning is that the person concerned, 
when committing the act, was on the territory of the issuing state and was required to respect 
the laws of that state, even if they differ from those of the state of execution of the European 
arrest warrant.51 However, in its conclusion, the Conseil d’État expressed some reservations 
with regards to the crimes listed in the EAWFD in a generic way, as such a general list may 
contribute to legal uncertainty.   
 The Legal Committee of the Parliament provided a detailed analysis on the rule of double 
criminality in the context of the EAWFD. According to the Report, the text of the Framework 
Decision is a compromise between two different approaches: the first approach calls for a 
mechanism of mutual recognition of all the judgments in criminal matters rendered by the 
Member States’ judicial authorities; the second approach focuses on the prior harmonisation 
of criminal law at the EU level before the systematic recognition of the decisions of the 
                                                
48  Interview with the Premier Avocat Général of the Parquet Général (Luxembourg), Jeannot Nies, conducted 
on 27 February 2015.  
49  No. Judoc: 99864977, Tribunal d’Arrondissement de Luxembourg, 109/19.01.2007.  
50  No. Judoc: 99864974, Tribunal d’Arrondissement de Luxembourg, 2369/12.12.2006.  
51  Opinion No. 5104/1, n. 41, p. 4. 
18 
 
Member States. The mutual recognition of judicial decisions without prior harmonisation of 
the relevant criminal legislation presupposes abandonment of the rule of double criminality.  
 The Parliamentary Committee recalled that the principle of double criminality does not 
require the elements of a particular offence to be the same in the two states concerned or to 
fall under the same qualification. In order to reconcile the conflicting positions of individual 
Member States, some of which are in favour of the complete abolition of the principle of 
double criminality while others seek to maintain what they consider as an elementary 
procedural guarantee, the EAWFD maintains the rule of double criminality except in the case 
of 32 offences set out in a generic list. According to the Report, the rule of double criminality 
is not abolished between Member States, except for with regard to offences that are 
considered to be particularly serious. The system in place is a ‘variable geometry system’.52 
 There is no case law dealing with the principle of legality of crimes or the abolition of the 
rule of double criminality in the context of the EAWFD. The relevant constitutional provision 
is Art. 14, which has been transposed mutatis mutandis in Art. 20 of the new draft 
Constitution: ‘No penalty may be established or applied except by virtue of the law.’  
 
2.3.3 Fair trial and in absentia judgments 
 
2.3.3.1 No constitutional issues regarding in absentia judgments have been raised. National 
courts have not had the opportunity to revisit the standard of protection for in absentia 
judgments in the context of the EAWFD.  
 The right to have access to the courts is provided in Art. 13 of the Constitution and in the 
new Art. 19 of the draft Constitution. The national courts have not dealt with the protection of 
this right to date. According to legal commentary in Luxembourg, the national courts would 
likely apply Art. 6 ECHR as such, and not the general principles of EU law regarding the 
protection of this right.53  
 Article 19 of the Act of 17 March 2004 provides that where the EAW has been issued for 
the purposes of executing a sentence or a detention order imposed by a decision rendered in 
absentia and if the person concerned has not been summoned in person or otherwise 
informed of the date and place of the hearing which led to the decision rendered in absentia, 
surrender may be subject to the condition that the issuing judicial authority gives adequate 
assurance that the person who is the subject of the European arrest warrant will have an 
opportunity to apply for a retrial of the case in the issuing Member State, and to be present at 
the hearing. The Conseil d’État did not have any observations regarding this provision that 
transposes Art. 5 (1) of the EAWFD. 
 
2.3.4 The right to a fair trial – practical challenges regarding a trial abroad 
 
2.3.4.1 The issue of surrender of nationals was raised both in the discussions of the Conseil 
d’État and of the Legal Committee of the Parliament in the process of adopting the Act of 17 
March 2004. Luxembourg had made a reservation to the European Convention on Extradition 
of 13 December 1957, stating that there would be no extradition of Luxembourg citizens (and 
residents with strong links to Luxembourg) to other states. Article 7(1) of the Act of 20 June 
2001 on extradition incorporates this reservation by stating that Luxembourg shall not 
extradite Luxembourg nationals. In the context of the EAWFD, the Conseil d’État pondered 
on whether such a rule is out of date, and underlined the political reluctance to abandon this 
                                                
52 Report No. 5104/4, n. 46, p. 3 
53 Wiveness 2000. 
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rule. Both the Conseil d’État and the Legal Committee of the Parliament have recognised that 
the obligation to extradite nationals constitutes a necessary step for the creation of the 
European area of freedom, security and justice.  
 However, Art. 20 of the Act of 17 March 2004 provides that where a person who is the 
subject of an EAW for the purposes of prosecution is a national of Luxembourg, surrender 
may be subject to the condition that the person, after being heard, is returned to Luxembourg 
in order to serve the custodial sentence or detention order passed against him in the issuing 
Member State. The same applies for residents of Luxembourg who have established links 
with the country. This provision enacts the requirements of Art. 5(3) of the EAWFD.  
 The Conseil d’État has emphasised that the requirements of Art. 12 of the Constitution 
need to be taken into consideration upon an arrest in the context of the EAWFD. Article 12 
refers to the right to liberty and to protection from illegal arrest. According to the Conseil 
d’État, the type of hearing that would be granted to the arrested person when brought before 
the national court was not clear in the proposed bill. Although verifying the identity of the 
arrested person is considered appropriate, it is hardly conceivable that the national judge 
could conduct an investigation on the facts and the charges against the requested person. The 
judge is limited in principle to asking the person whether he intends to make any statements 
about the facts which form the basis of the European arrest warrant and to acknowledging 
and registering these statements, thereby complying with the provisions of Art. 14 of the 
Framework Decision.  
 Pursuant to this proposal, Art. 8 of the Act of 17 March 2004 provides that the arrested 
person should be brought before an investigative judge within 24 hours of the arrest. The 
investigative judge registers any statements the arrested person may declare and provides a 
hearing regarding his or her detention. The investigative judge decides whether the arrested 
person will be held in detention on the basis of the arrest warrant, by taking into 
consideration the circumstances of the case and the statements of the arrested person. 
 As underlined by the Premier Avocat Général of the Parquet Général (Luxembourg), 
travels expenses are always covered by the issuing authority, while the assistance of a lawyer 
and of an interpreter, if necessary, is provided by Luxembourg during all proceedings taking 
place in Luxembourg.54  
 
2.3.4.2 According to the Premier Avocat Général of the Parquet Général (Luxembourg), the 
executing judicial authorities in Luxembourg do not follow up on cases of people who have 
been extradited, as these cases fall outside of Luxembourg’s jurisdiction.55 
 Article 8 of the Act of 17 March 2004 provides that if a person held in Luxembourg on the 
basis of an EAW is surrendered to the issuing authority and is acquitted or dismissed in the 
issuing state, his or her detention in Luxembourg does not give right to compensation under 
the Law of 30 December 1981 on Inoperative Preventive Detentions.  
 According to the (incomplete) annual reports of the Ministry of Justice of Luxembourg on 
judicial activities for the period 2004–2013:  
 
Judicial year Extraditions EAW 
Ministère Public / 
Parquet Général of 
Luxembourg  
EAW 
Parquet Général of 
Diekirch 
Issued / received 
2004–2005 2 35 received 7 / 3  
                                                
54 According to his estimate, no (or only a few) Luxembourgers have ever been extradited from Luxembourg. 
Interview with the Premier Avocat Général of the Parquet Général (Luxembourg), Jeannot Nies, conducted on 
27 February 2015.    
55 Ibid.  
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2005–2006 25 15 received 5 / 2  
2006–2007 - -  - - 1 / 7  
2007–2008 - -  - -  - -  
2008–2009 - -  - - 1 / 7  
2009–2010 - -  - -  2 / 3  
2010–2011 - - - - 0 / 4  
2011–2012 - -  - - 0 / 2  
2012–2013 - -  - -  7 / 3  
 
 The aforementioned numbers may, however, be inaccurate due to a lack of sufficient 
information specifically regarding EAWs in the annual reports. According to another source, 
207 European Arrest Warrants were issued and 109 were executed in Luxembourg from 
2005–2009.56 Finally, according to the 2011 Report of the EU Commission, during the period 
2005–2009, the following EAWs were issued and executed in Luxembourg:57 
 
 EAW issued in Luxembourg  EAW executed in 
Luxembourg 
2005 42 24 
2006 35 22 
2007 44 15 
2008 40 22 
2009 46 26 
 
2.3.5 The right to effective judicial protection: the principle of mutual recognition in EU 
criminal law and abolition of the exequatur in civil and commercial matters  
 
2.3.5.1 Luxembourg is party to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters of 20 April 1959, and has made a reservation to this convention. According to this 
reservation, Luxembourg applies the following legal requirements when executing requests 
for search and seizure of property (letters rogatory for search and seizure):  
a) the offence underlying the request must be punishable both under the law of the 
requesting Party and of the executing Party; 
b) the offence underlying the request must give rise to extradition from the requested 
country; 
c) the execution of the request must be consistent with the law of the requested Party. 
 More precisely, Luxembourg has declared that any requests rogatory for search or seizure 
will be executed in so far as they relate to facts which give rise to extradition under the 
European Convention on Extradition, and if a national court has authorised the execution in 
accordance with its law.  
 The Conseil d’État has underlined that the EAWFD is designed to replace the provisions 
of the European Convention on Extradition vis-à-vis relations between EU Member States. In 
its Opinion, the Conseil d’État emphasised the new legal regime under the EAWFD. The 
Conseil d’État declared that even in the absence of an express link between the EAWFD and 
the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in criminal matters, the risk of the EAWFD 
having an impact on the reservation made by Luxembourg cannot be completely ruled out. 
The Conseil d’État argued that the reference to the European Convention on Extradition 
                                                
56 http://www.europaforum.public.lu/fr/actualites/2011/04/comm-mandat-arret-europeen/index.html.  
57 2011 Report of the EU Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation since 
2007 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 
procedures between Member States, COM(2011) 175 final, p. 12.  
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regarding the requirement of dual criminality becomes inoperative in relations with other EU 
Member States, and that any reference to the provisions of this Convention must now be 
understood as a reference to the provisions under the new regime. Therefore, the Conseil 
d’État deemed the reservation made by Luxembourg in favour of the new legal regime to be 
inoperative.  
 The Conseil d’État did raise some constitutional concerns regarding the EAWFD. The 
Framework Decision does not enumerate offences of political nature among the grounds for 
refusal to execute a warrant.58 Admittedly, Art. 1(3) of the EAWFD,59 by its reference to 
Article 6 TEU, affects neither the law on asylum nor the right of a state to refuse to execute 
an EAW when the surrender is sought for political purposes. However, both the Act of 20 
June 2001 on extradition and the European Convention on Extradition (Arts. 3(1) and (2)) 
distinguish requests for extradition which are related to political offences from extradition 
requests which pursue a political goal. According to the Conseil d’État, this distinction and 
rule do not have a constitutional value.60 The Conseil d’État refers to the cautious position 
that Luxembourg took with regards to the European Convention against terrorism, where 
Luxembourg did not make any reservation regarding its obligation to extradite because of the 
political nature of the offence. However, Luxembourg does not accept or apply in a generic 
way the principle laid down in Art. 5 of the European Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrorism,61 namely that no offence may be regarded by the Member State as a political 
offence, as a fact connected with such an offence or as an offence inspired by political 
motives. A similar stance is to be expected by Luxembourg regarding refusal to execute a 
warrant if the offence for which the warrant was issued was of political nature.  
 Regarding the abolition of the exequatur in civil and commercial matters, an empirical 
study of the exequatur orders issued by the District Court of Luxembourg in the period of 
2008–2009 (that is before the period that the abolition of the exequatur became effective by 
virtue of Regulation 1215/2012) has been conducted.62 In statistical terms, the District Court 
of Luxembourg declared executory on the territory of Luxembourg the totality of the 
decisions presented in the exequatur orders. The speed with which the exequatur orders were 
rendered is impressive: 80% of the orders were rendered within a week. Only 4.4% of the 
enforcement orders were subject to appeal before the Luxembourg Court of Appeal, of which 
only two (0.6%) were successful. In the first case the request in exequatur was found 
inadmissible ratione materiae,63 and in the second case the court found that the defendant’s 
rights were violated as he had not been duly notified about the case against him in the first 
place.64 
 
2.3.5.2 Apart from the discussion on the suitability of the legal instrument (Framework 
Decision) in the Conseil d’État, no discussion on the appropriateness of mutual recognition 
on criminal law matters has been raised in Luxembourg. The Conseil d’État has underscored 
                                                
58 Opinion No. 5104/1, n. 41, p. 5.  
59 ‘Nothing in this Framework Decision may be interpreted as prohibiting refusal to surrender a person for 
whom a European arrest warrant has been issued when there are reasons to believe, on the basis of objective 
elements, that the said arrest warrant has been issued for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on the 
grounds of his or her sex, race, religion, ethnic origin, nationality, language, political opinions or sexual 
orientation, or that that person's position may be prejudiced for any of these reasons.’ Recital (12), Council 
Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, n. 40.   
60 Opinion No. 5104/1, n. 41, p. 6.  
61 Concluded at Strasbourg on 27 January 1977. 
62 Muller and Cuniberti 2013, p. 6; see also Cuniberti and Rueda 2010. 
63 Judgment CA Luxembourg, 7 January 2010, No. 34658. 
64 Judgment CA Luxembourg, 10 February 2011, No. 35005. 
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the importance of the goal of establishing an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in 
Europe.  
 
2.3.5.3 No concerns regarding any change in the role of national courts have been expressed 
in Luxembourg. In general, it is safe to argue that there is a strong commitment to the EU 
mechanisms.   
 
2.3.5.4 Article 3 of the Act of 17 March 2004 provides for a proportionality test applicable 
upon both the issuance and the execution of an EAW. Specifically, an EAW may be issued 
only for offences punishable by law with a custodial sentence or a detention order for a 
maximum period of at least twelve months, or when a custodial sentence or a detention order 
has been imposed for sanctions prescribed for a period of at least four months.  
 Regarding the execution of an EAW, Art. 3(3) provides for a proportionality test even for 
the offences which escape the rule of double criminality. Consequently, the Luxembourgish 
authorities shall review whether the 32 enumerated offences are punishable in the issuing 
state with a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least three 
years.  
 The introduction of these proportionality tests was the object of analysis in the Opinion of 
the Conseil d’État and in the Report of the Parliamentary Committee.65 Drawing analogies 
from the French Conseil d’État, both the Conseil d’État and the Parliamentary Committee 
emphasised the necessity for the issuing state to provide proof that the offence for which an 
arrest warrant is issued is punishable under the national law with a custodial sentence or a 
detention order of a specific threshold of severity. This condition responds to the 
requirements of the constitutional order. Therefore, it is not sufficient that the offence for 
which an EAW is issued falls within the scope of the exhaustive list of the 32 offences which 
escape the review of dual criminality, but the offence must also be sufficiently serious for the 
authorities in Luxembourg to execute the EAW.  
 
2.3.6 Constitutional rights regarding other aspects of EU criminal law 
 
 To the Expert’s knowledge no further constitutional issues have arisen in Luxembourg’s 
case law and legal commentary or do arise in his view in relation to European criminal law in 
the Grand Duchy. 
 
2.4 The EU Data Retention Directive  
 
2.4.1 According to the Constitution: ‘The home is inviolable. No domiciliary visit may be 
made except in cases and according to the procedure laid down by the law’ (Art. 15); ‘The 
secrecy of correspondence is inviolable. The law determines the agents responsible for the 
violation of the secrecy of correspondence entrusted to the postal services. The law 
determines the guarantee to be afforded to the secrecy of telegrams’ (Art. 28). 
 However, no constitutional issues have been raised in Luxembourg with regard to the 
implementation of the Data Retention Directive66 (DRD) or with regard to its application by 
the courts. The retention of data had already been allowed in Luxembourg before the 
                                                
65 Opinion Conseil d’Etat of 19 December 2003, doc. parl. No. 5104/1, p. 9 and Report No. 5104/4, n. 46, p. 6.  
66 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of 
data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications 
services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC, [2006] OJ L 105/54. 
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adoption of the Data Retention Directive on the basis of the ‘Privacy and Electronic 
Communications Act’ of 30 May 2005.67 
 The national implementing act of the DRD of 13 July 2010 has not been challenged in the 
national Constitutional Court nor in any other court on grounds of the legality of the 
Directive. 
 There is no previous jurisprudence as regards the constitutionality of data retention in 
Luxembourg. There is also little case law of the national Constitutional Court and no cases 
involving a clear definition of the right to privacy versus law enforcement measures. It is 
therefore not possible to derive whether or not a court, when dealing with a national measure 
comparable to the DRD, would raise a constitutional issue or – as this is possible in the 
Luxembourgish legal order – directly in view of the ECHR. If asked to speculate (not based 
on previous case law), from a Luxembourgish  perspective it is rather unlikely that a 
comparable measure would be struck down in its entirety.  
 While the transposition of the DRD in the Luxembourgish legal system does not seem to 
have raised particular issues,68 it is noteworthy that, following the ECJ judgment annulling 
the DRD, Luxembourg decided to amend its national law and has in the meanwhile launched 
the legislative procedure in this respect. On 7 January 2015, the Ministry of Justice filed a 
proposal which modifies both the domestic Code of Criminal Procedure and the domestic Act 
implementing the DRD, i.e. the Act of 30 May 2005 laying down specific provisions for the 
protection of persons with regard to the processing of personal data in the electronic 
communications sector (Privacy and Electronic Communications Act 2005) (hereinafter 
Proposal). 69  
 The Proposal concerns both traffic data (Art. 5 of the Privacy and Electronic 
Communications Act 2005) and location data other than traffic data (Art. 9 of the Privacy and 
Electronic Communications Act 2005), and brings four main amendments to the existing 
domestic rules. The Proposal also foresees that a grand-ducal decree will be adopted in order 
to lay down detailed enforcement rules to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the data. 
The Proposal provides for access for law enforcement bodies to the retained data on the basis 
of an exhaustive list of criminal offences, which carry a sentence of at least one year 
(previously the crimes concerned were not listed). The Proposal further stipulates that the 
retained data must be irrevocably and without any delay deleted upon expiration of the 
retention period. Electronic communication providers are no longer permitted to store the 
data in an anonymised form after the expiration of the retention period. Finally, the Proposal 
foresees that data shall be stored on the territory of the European Union and increases the 
penalties in case of non-compliance with the Privacy and Electronic Communications Act 
2005 to a sentence of six months to two years of imprisonment. 
 
2.5 Unpublished or secret legislation 
 
2.5.1 To the Expert’s knowledge, the issue of unpublished EU legislation has not arisen as 
such in domestic case law or in the public debate. As the Luxembourgish language is not an 
official language of the EU and French is the official legal language in Luxembourg, no issue 
of EU legislation unpublished in the national language could arise in any case.  
                                                
67 Loi du 30 mai 2005 relative aux dispositions spécifiques de protection de la personne à l’égard du traitement 
des données à caractère personnel dans le secteur des communications électroniques et portant modification 
des articles 88-2 et 88-4 du Code d’instruction criminelle, Memorial A-73, 7 June 2005, p. 1144. 
68 In this respect, see Cole and Boehm 2012.  
69 Doc. parl. No. 6763 Projet de loi portant modification du Code d’instruction criminelle et de la loi modifiée 
du 30 mai 2005 concernant la protection de la vie privée dans le secteur des communications électroniques. 
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 The main rules to be referred to in this context are Arts. 112 and 36 of the Luxembourgish 
Constitution. According to Art. 112, ‘[a]ny law, order or regulation of general or municipal 
administration is binding only once published in the form determined by law’. In 1901, la 
Cour observed that ‘[a]t all times and in all legislation, there has always been the immutable 
principle that no law shall become mandatory without being published’.70 Statutory and 
regulatory acts generally enter into force four days following their publication in the 
Mémorial, i.e. the Luxembourgish official journal. 
 Given that, in the Luxembourgish legal system, international treaties ratified by 
Luxembourg take precedence over domestic law including the domestic Constitution, the 
requirements as to publication apply to international agreements. In this context Art. 36(3) 
indeed prohibits the existence of ‘secret treaties’. Acts approving international treaties are 
published in the Mémorial together with the text of the international treaties concerned. 
 With regard to EU secondary legislation, the publication obligation can be satisfied in 
Luxembourg by referring to the publication of the given act in the Official Journal of the EU. 
 
2.6 Rights and general principles of law in the context of market regulation: property 
rights, legal certainty, non-retroactivity and proportionality 
 
2.6.1 No standard of protection issues have apparently ever been raised in Luxembourg with 
regard to the standard of protection of property rights, legal certainty, legitimate expectations, 
non-retroactivity or proportionality in relation to EU measures. Again, the far-reaching 
understanding of primacy of EU law, the lack of competence of the Constitutional Court and 
the rather underdeveloped standards of fundamental rights in the Constitution may explain 
this finding.  
 
2.7 The ESM Treaty, austerity programmes and the democratic, rule-of-law-based state 
 
2.7.1 a) Luxembourg’s commitment to the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 
amounts to 1.947 billion EUR. The ESM capital subscription made by Luxembourg amounts 
to 1.753 billion EUR, of which 0.2 billion is as paid-in capital. The total participation of 
Luxembourg in the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and EFSF amounts to 3.753 billion 
EUR71. The GDP of Luxembourg in 2013 has been estimated at approximately 45 billion 
EUR72 and the Luxembourgish budget for 2015 (expenses) is foreseen at approximately 
15.658 billion EUR73. 
 The constitutionality of the commitment under the ESM has not been put into question 
although some objections to the laws approving the respective aspects related to the ESM74 
amendment of Art. 136 TFEU were voiced during the legislative procedure75. 
                                                
70 Cour, March 9 1901, Pasicrisie luxembourgeoise 6, p. 297. 




73 See http://www.budget.public.lu/#!/bleck.  
74 La loi portant approbation de la décision du Conseil européen du 25 mars 2011 modifiant l’article 136 du 
traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne en ce qui concerne un mécanisme de stabilité pour les Etats 
membres dont la monnaie est l’euro; loi portant approbation du traité instituant le mécanisme européen de 
stabilité, signé le 2 février 2012 à Bruxelle ; loi relative à la participation de l’Etat au mécanisme européen de 





 The Conseil d’État has also expressed several objections.76 It has pointed out the absence 
of a fiche financière, i.e. a financial statement that has to be associated with all Acts 
burdening the state budget. Also, the Conseil d’État has expressed some perplexity as to the 
specific features of the ESM, its adjustments having preceded its actual launch, which leaves 
the impression that the EU Member States are following rather than shaping economic 
realities. Interestingly, the Conseil d’État has expressed the position that the ESM must 
evolve as a part of the EU institutions and must not drift towards the intergovernmental 
method that some of the Member States seem to favour. Moreover, the Conseil d’État has 
questioned the arguably insufficient size of the capital of the ESM (700 billion EUR) in the 
light of the real needs of the Member States in difficulty as well as the needs of European 
banks. Finally, the Conseil d’État has expressed its general regret with regard to the 
unsatisfactory management of the public debt in the eurozone and the systemic nature of the 
financial crisis therein. It its view, the statement of reasons of the legislative proposal could 
have been more analytical and could have spelled out the position that Luxembourg should 
defend in the context of the ongoing discussion in Europe. 
 
 b) See the reply in a) above. 
 
 c) In Luxembourg, debate on the unconditional nature of the commitments does not seem 
to have arisen. 
 
2.7.2 No debate on other proposed measure seems to have taken place in Luxembourg. This 
may also be due to the fact that Luxembourg has not been subject to any austerity regime and, 
rather to the contrary, benefits from the presence of the ESM on its territory. In this respect, it 
is noteworthy that the predecessor of the ESM, the European Financial Stability Facility 
(relevant for financing programmes pre-existing the establishment of the ESM), was not an 
international organisation but a private law entity (société anonyme) established under 
Luxembourgish law. For this reason the Conseil d’État criticised the initially broad scope of 
the immunity of jurisdiction and execution granted to the EFSF (which was suggested to be 
similar to that granted to the ESM) as contrary to Art. 6 ECHR and Art. 10bis of the 
Constitution.77 In response to this critique, the draft Act regarding Luxembourg’s 
participation in the ESM was modified. 
 
2.7.3 The question on bailouts is not applicable to Luxembourg. Economic issues have been 
dealt with recently by Luxembourg, but their nature cannot be compared with those that have 
been tackled in relation to austerity programmes. The unsatisfactory competitiveness of 
Luxembourg has been pointed out. As of 2013, Luxembourg has modified its system of 
pensions and the system of automatic wage increases has been limited in order to bring such 
increases in line with the economic reality.78 
 
2.8 Judicial review of EU measures: access to justice and the standard of review 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
75 For an overview of the position of Luxembourg on the euro crisis and its management as well as on the 
legislative discussion, see Kroeger 2014.  
76 See opinion of Conseil d’Etat dated 6 March 2012, on Projet de loi portant approbation de la décision du 
Conseil européen du 25 mars 2011 modifiant l’article 136 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union 
européenne en ce qui concerne un mécanisme de stabilité pour les Etats membres dont la monnaie est l’euro, 
doc. parl. No. 6334/1.  
77 Complementary Opinion Conseil d’Etat, doc. parl. No. 6406/3, 12 June 2012, p. 2. 
78 Cf. Kroeger 2014, point I.1. 
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2.8.1 a) There are unfortunately no reliable statistics available in Luxembourg concerning the 
number of cases in which the applicants have requested preliminary rulings with regard to the 
validity of EU measures. In the time frame since 2001, only two cases were identified after a 
thorough research of the case law of the respective civil, social and administrative courts.  
 First, in a case brought to the Conseil supérieur des assurances sociales, the applicant 
challenged the validity of Regulation 1408/71 (on the cooperation between social security 
systems) with regard to former Art. 48(2) EC (now Art. 45 (2) TFEU) on the free movement 
of workers. It was argued that the application of the residence clause in Art. 71 of that 
Regulation constitutes indirect discrimination on grounds of nationality with regard to 
unemployed frontier workers.79  
 Second, in a case brought to the tribunal administratif, the applicants challenged the 
validity of Directive 2003/87/CE (from 13 October 2003, establishing a scheme for 
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community) based on the ground that 
the Directive would not sufficiently take into account the specific situation of the steel 
industry within global competition.80 The courts did not submit a reference for a preliminary 
ruling to the ECJ in either of these cases.  
 
 b) From 2006 to the end of 2014, Luxembourgish courts sent 26 preliminary ruling 
requests to the ECJ. All of them were interpretative questions, and not a single one contested 
the validity of an EU measure. 
 
2.8.2 In the Expert’s view, it does not seem that the standard of judicial review by the EU 
courts is considered lower than that of the domestic courts from a Luxembourgish point of 
view. Moreover, the domestic courts commonly give the impression that they share the 
standards of review applied by the EU courts, to which they refer quite extensively.  
  
2.8.3 The approach of the Constitutional Court reviewing the constitutionality of legislative 
acts could be considered – at least statistically – as rather vigorous. In almost one-third (36) 
of its currently (by 20 February 2015) 116 decisions, it has declared provisions of legislative 
acts contrary to articles of the Constitution. Its control is, however, very limited in scope, as it 
can only review the constitutionality of such provisions in response to preliminary questions 
from ordinary judges that must precisely indicate the contested provisions and the relevant 
articles of the Constitution. It has furthermore been shown that the Constitutional Court 
apparently recognises a wider margin of appreciation for the legislator in the field of 
economic and social law that in the field of civil and family law.81 
 If the Constitutional Court declares a legislative provision contrary to the Constitution, the 
ordinary judges who have to decide on the case are obliged to disregard that provision, 
which, however, remains formally in force.  
 The Conseil d’État also plays an important role as a guardian of the Constitution. Its 
function is to assess ex ante the conformity of all draft legislative acts and grand-ducal 
decrees with norms of higher law, comprising the Constitution, international treaties and the 
general principles of law. The Chambre in general follows its opinions. 
 Unfortunately, there are no further reliable statistical data available on the proportion of 
challenges to the validity of a domestic Act of Parliament that have lead to annulment of the 
Act in question. 
 
                                                
79 Arrêt du 3 décembre 2007, ADEM 2006/0094. 
80 Arrêt du 5 avril 2006, nos. 20372 et 20373 du rôle. 
81 Cf. Kinsch 2008 at p. 89. 
27 
 
2.8.4 On the one hand, the Constitutional Court is not entitled to review legislative acts 
approving international treaties. Acts of the Chambre transposing or executing obligations 
deriving from secondary EU legislation are not explicitly excluded from the Constitutional 
Court’s competence. Until now, no such Act has, however, been submitted to the 
Constitutional Court in the context of a preliminary question from an ordinary court. The 
opinion seems to prevail that the ‘immunity’ of Acts approving treaties also covers Acts 
implementing EU legislation. No legislative act implementing EU legislation has ever been 
submitted to the Constitutional Court.  
 On the other hand, the ordinary courts may not review the constitutionality of legislative 
acts at all and, regarding the conformity of the latter with international law, they usually 
apply the principle of primacy very strictly. Thus, no judgment reviewing national measures 
implementing EU legislation against national or ECtHR standards of protection of rights 
could be identified. 
 
2.8.5 To the Expert’s knowledge no concern has been expressed in Luxembourg about a gap 
in judicial review resulting from an allegedly lower standard of review by the ECJ. As the 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Luxembourgish Constitution do not go beyond the 
standard of the ECHR in many respects, the accession of the EU to the ECHR does not raise 
concerns about a potential gap in judicial review either. 
 
2.8.6 The issue of equal treatment of individuals falling within the scope of EU law and those 
falling within the scope of domestic protection of constitutional rights has only been raised 
once when the Chambre adopted the measure implementing Directive 2004/38 on the free 
movement of citizens of the EU82. In order to avoid any situations of ‘reverse discrimination’, 
Art. 12 (3) of the Act of 29 August 2008 on free movement of persons and immigration 
contains a clause stating that ‘family members of a Luxembourgish citizen … are equated 
with family members of a citizen of the EU’. 
 
2.9 Other constitutional rights and principles 
 
2.9.1 No other significant issues have arisen in Luxembourg with regard to constitutional 
rights or the rule of law in relation to EU law.  
 The transposition and implementation of EU measures by grand-ducal decrees is 
undeniably seen as a way to increase the speed of implementation, as well as the Grand 
Duchy’s ranking on the European Commission’s scoreboards. Every year, the Government as 
well as the Chambre proudly announce the progress made in this respect. The matter is 
currently determined by an Enabling Act (loi d’habilitation) adopted by the Chambre in 
1971, which is criticised because of technical insufficiencies and its limited scope, but is 
considered indispensable in principle. The Working Draft of the current constitutional 
amendment procedure foresees the addition of an article to the Constitution that will 
explicitly give the executive power the competence to transpose and implement EU measures 
by grand-ducal decree. 
 Acts of Parliament will thus lose some of their importance in national legislation because 
of the perceived need to streamline the procedures for the transposition and implementation 
of secondary EU legislation. In so far as ever more important sections of national legislation 
                                                
82 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens 
of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States 
amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 
73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC, [2004] OJ L 158/77. 
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are directly conditioned by Union law and legislators face strict deadlines for the 
transposition of directives, the Chambre has adopted an Enabling Act conferring the 
competence to proceed on the executive exercising its regulatory competence.83   
 This Act, however, is limited in scope and has not really proven an ‘appropriate and 
effective response’ to the problems encountered.84 The inclusion of a new Art. 45 in the 
Constitution, set out in the 2015 Working Draft and which obligates the Head of State to 
adopt all the necessary regulations for the application of legally binding acts of the European 
Union, will eradicate a number of legal uncertainties in this area.  
 
2.10 Common constitutional traditions 
 
2.10.1 In the Expert’s view, ‘common constitutional traditions’ is a very broad and rather 
vague concept that has helped the ECJ to legitimise its jurisprudence that introduces 
fundamental rights as general principles of law in the EU legal order. This concept may 
certainly encompass the constitutional rights and principles addressed in the Questionnaire as 
well as the rights and principles enshrined in the ECHR or within the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU. However, in the Expert’s view, the broadness of the concept does not allow 
for the deduction of a precise normative substance and a clear-cut scope of these rights and 
principles that would be shared by all of the Member States. 
 It appears difficult to infer the existence of a ‘common constitutional tradition’ from an 
element considered in a single Member State as an element of its constitutional identity. To 
be considered as a ‘common constitutional tradition’, such a right or principle does not need 
to be part of a Member State’s identity. It would be sufficient that it has been recognised as 
an element of constitutional law by the Constitution itself or any relevant case law. 
 
2.10.2 For reasons of uncertainty regarding their content and scope, it seems difficult to 
envisage how these ‘common constitutional traditions’ could become a more direct and 
relevant source of EU law. Within the judicial dialogue between national judges and the ECJ, 
there might, however, still be merit in invoking these traditions at least in so far as it would 
be possible to establish the existence of a commonly shared standard based on a serious study 
of comparative case law stemming from a large group of Member States. The question is 
whether this is reasonably feasible for national courts when sending a preliminary ruling 
reference to the ECJ.  
 
2.11 Article 53 of the Charter and the issue of stricter constitutional standards  
 
2.11.1 There has been no discussion in Luxembourg on whether the Court of Justice was 
justified in setting the standard of protection of Charter rights at the level of the ECHR. There 
are no constitutional rights or principles protected under the Luxembourgish Constitution or 
by the national courts where a significantly higher level of protection can be identified in 
comparison with the standards set by the ECtHR.  
 In the Expert’s view, higher standards at national level and a greater deference to national 
constitutional or supreme courts should be allowed by the ECJ whenever the courts of the 
relevant Member State can reasonably argue that this higher standard is an element of its 
constitutional identity as protected under Art. 4 TEU. The national courts should, however, 
                                                
83 Act of 9 August 1971 (as amended) ‘on the execution and sanctioning of decisions and directives and the 
sanctioning of regulations of the European Communities in the economic, technical, agricultural, forestry, social 
and transport spheres’. 
84 Cf.. Schmit 2013, p. 5 and Weirich 1986, p. 966. 
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also seek to avoid conflicts between supposedly different standards by seeking to interpret the 
relevant national constitutional rights and principles, as far as possible, in the light of the 
corresponding provisions of the ECHR and the Charter, even in cases which do not fall 
within the scope of the latter.  
 
2.12 Democratic debate on constitutional rights and values 
 
2.12.1 a) There has been no significant public deliberation on constitutional rights in 
Luxembourg, neither at the time of adoption nor at the time of national implementation of the 
EAWFD. The debate was exclusively held within the Conseil d’État and the Chambre during 
the legislative implementation procedure. No objection based on the safeguards for 
constitutional rights was raised. 
 
b) The same applies with regard to the adoption and implementation of the DRD. 
 
2.12.2 From a Luxembourgish point of view, no important constitutional issue has ever been 
raised at the stage of implementing EU law. For the reasons already explained, the domestic 
system of constitutional review has never experienced a challenge made to national 
legislation implementing EU law.  
 In the Expert’s view, the members of the national governments should raise such 
important constitutional issues when deliberating new EU legislation within the Council of 
Ministers. In order to be aware of such issues before the final adoption of an EU act, Member 
States should establish internal advisory procedures alerting the Government of any 
foreseeable constitutional implications of an envisaged EU act. In Luxembourg such a 
preliminary opinion could be prepared by the Conseil d’État. A wider consultation including 
the Chambre and other bodies and NGOs would probably be difficult to accomplish within 
the usual time constraints. 
 
2.12.3 The Expert would indeed support a recommendation to suspend the application and 
carry out a review of EU measures, if important constitutional issues have been identified by 
a number of constitutional courts, even though some Member States’ constitutional courts do 
not review the constitutionality of EU measures or national implementation acts of these 
measures. A Member State like Luxembourg would indeed be excluded from such a 
mechanism for the time being.  
 The problem will be to define what an ‘important’ constitutional issue exactly is, and what 
number of national constitutional courts would be considered sufficient to initiate such a 
suspension procedure. Another practical problem would arise from the fact that such issues 
might be raised over a long period after the adoption of the EU measure according to the 
features of the national systems of constitutional review providing for ex ante review, ex post 
review or a combination of both. 
 The Expert would not support a general recommendation to recognise as a defence on the 
part of a Member State in an infringement proceeding that unconstitutionality has been 
identified in accordance with the domestic system of control of constitutionality. On the one 
hand, such a defence would not be applicable to Luxembourg and, on the other hand, it 
should be strictly limited to infringement proceedings that concern the implementation of an 
EU measure that is considered in the particular Member State as contrary to an element of the 




2.13 Experts’ analysis on the protection of constitutional rights in EU law 
 
2.13.1 From a Luxembourgish point of view (but also as a general position), the Expert does 
not share the concerns of an ‘overall reduction’ in the standard of protection of constitutional 
rights and the rule of law in the context of EU law. With regard to the standard of protection 
under Luxembourgish constitutional law, it might even be argued that there has been an 
overall increase of the standard of protection of fundamental rights due to the combined 
influence of the case law of the ECtHR and of the ECJ. The alleged reductions in the standard 
of protection linked in particular to the EAWFD and the DRD can not be confirmed with 
regard to the Grand Duchy. 
 
 
3 Constitutional issues in global governance 
 
3.1 Constitutional rules on international organisations and the ratification of treaties 
 
3.1.1 As outlined in Sect. 1.3.1, although Art. 49bis provides only for temporary transfers of 
powers, it has been interpreted broadly in order to be compatible with the accession of 
Luxembourg to the EU Treaties.  
 In 1956, the Conseil d’État considered it more appropriate to retain the temporary 
character of the delegation of powers, as it emphasised the precariousness of any consented 
devolution to international institutions.85 No other limits to the transfer of powers are 
provided for in the Constitution. However, Art. 1 of the Constitution postulates the values 
upheld in Luxembourg in general and not in the specific context of international cooperation: 
democracy, liberty, independence and the indivisibility of the state.  
 Regarding the ratification of international treaties, Art. 37 of the Constitution provides that 
treaties are operative after having been approved by law and published in the form specified 
for the publication of laws. Secret treaties are abolished. International treaties that transfer 
powers to international institutions need to be approved by Parliament, according to a special 
majority requirement of two-thirds of the members, similarly to the constitutional amending 
procedure as provided by Art. 114. Reservations to international treaties by Luxembourg 
require legislative approval as well.86 Article 95ter(2) explicitly prohibits the Constitutional 
Court from reviewing Acts of Parliament which transpose international treaties in the 
domestic legal order.  
 There is no reference to international customary law in the Constitution or in the draft text 
of the Constitution which is under consideration.  
 Luxembourg is a founding member of the United Nations, NATO and the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). Article 118 of the Constitution provides that its provisions do not 
constitute an obstacle to the approval of the ICC Statute and to the exercise of Luxembourg’s 
obligations under the ICC Statute.87 The draft text of the Constitution contains a similar 
provision in Art. 107. Luxembourg also accepts the jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice as compulsory, ipso facto and without the requirement of reciprocity, in any disputes 
arising after 1930, regarding situations or facts subsequent to its signature, except in cases 
                                                
85 Doc. parl. No. 25 (516), p. CCIV. 
86 ‘Approbation des traités’ in Besch 2005, p. 143.  
87 Original French text: ‘Les dispositions de la Constitution ne font pas obstacle à l'approbation du Statut de la 
Cour Pénale Internationale, fait à Rome, le 17 juillet 1998, et à l’exécution des obligations en découlant dans 
les conditions prévues par ledit Statut.’  
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where the parties have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to another procedure or to 
another method of pacific settlement.88  
 
3.1.2 Article 49bis was introduced in 1956 by a constitutional amendment. This provision 
essentially raised two controversial questions: the position of the article in the Constitution’s 
structure and its content. Regarding the first question, the Conseil d’État opined that this 
provision needs a distinct position in the Constitution because it introduces a derogation to 
the exercise of the sovereign powers (executive, legislative and judicial) that are also 
regulated in Arts. 33–49. Moreover, this provision deals with the exercise of a new type of 
power, which is also linked to sovereignty. For these reasons the Conseil d’État proposed the 
addition of a new article, 49bis, instead of incorporating a new paragraph in the existing 
provisions. As for the choice of the wording ‘institutions of international law’, the Conseil 
d’État had originally proposed the phrase ‘international institutions’. This proposal, however, 
was not retained by the Parliamentary Committee, which opted for the term ‘institutions of 
international law’ in order to encompass not only international but supranational institutions 
as well.89  
 Drawing inspiration from the Belgian Constitution of 1831, Art. 37 was last modified by 
the 1956 constitutional amendment. During the revision, Art. 37 was at the centre of a debate 
between the Government and the Conseil d’Etat. The Parliament declared its intention to 
systemise and integrate all the constitutional provisions on international relations in one 
chapter, while the Government proposed the addition of a series of new articles to Art. 37 in 
order to exhaustively consolidate all the constitutional provisions on international relations. 
These proposals were weighed with care by the Conseil d’Etat, which opted for the solution 
of adding only a new Art. 49bis, leaving the structure of the Constitution intact.  
 The amendment of 1956 did not alter the principle of the approval of international treaties 
by Parliament. The constitutional amendment only specified the form that this approval 
would take, by adding the requirement of approval by a law. In its Opinion of 10 July 1956, 
the Conseil d’État underlined the distinction between the enforceability of the approving law 
and of the international treaty. They are two different procedures, which may take place 
simultaneously or separately, but both need to be compatible with the corresponding 
constitutional provisions. The Conseil d’État adopted, finally, one formal requirement, that of 
the publication of the approving law. 
 Article 48 of the proposed draft Constitution contains a similar provision to Art. 37 
regarding the ratification of international treaties. Instead of naming the Grand Duke, the 
provision states that the ‘Head of State’ shall be responsible for concluding international 
treaties. The draft provision includes a reference to the procedure for the termination of an 
international treaty, similar to the procedure foreseen for the conclusion of a treaty, which is 
not included in the current version of Art. 37. The new draft article also states explicitly that 
the Head of State shall adopt all necessary regulations for the application of EU law in 
Luxembourg. 
 Article 118 was introduced in 2000 to allow for the approval of the ICC Statute and the 
participation of Luxembourg in the ICC. The Conseil d’État emphasised the principle of 
complementarity of the ICC vis-à-vis the national courts. The ICC was considered as 
advancement for the international protection of human rights, but the relevant constitutional 
amendment provoked difficulties. In its Opinion of 4 May 1999, the Conseil d’État stated that 
the non-recognition of immunity for state officials might not be consistent with Art. 4 of the 
Constitution, which provides for the inviolability of the Grand Duke, with Arts. 68–69 on the 
                                                
88 See http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=1&code=LU 
89 Doc. parl. No. 25 (516), p. CCIV. 
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immunity of Members of Parliament and with Arts. 82 and 116, which deal with the criminal 
responsibility of ministers. However and contrary to the position of the French Constitutional 
Court, the Conseil d’État in Luxembourg concluded that the ICC Statute was not 
incompatible with the Constitution, because the ICC Prosecutor’s investigation procedure is 
based on consultations with the state authorities concerned. The Conseil d’Etat did not 
consider it appropriate to revise all the relevant constitutional provisions concerning the 
immunity of state officials. According to the Conseil d’Etat, Art. 118 intended to neutralise 
any obstacle that the Constitution might pose to the creation and function of the ICC.90 The 
Parliamentary Committee accepted the opinion of the Conseil d’Etat. Article 118 was 
considered the necessary step for the adaptation of the Luxembourgish constitutional legal 
order to the ICC Statute.91 Since the approval of the ICC Statute has already taken place and 
is no longer relevant, the new draft Art. 107 provides that the Constitution shall not hamper 
Luxembourg’s obligations under the ICC Statute.92  
 All these amendments and the current Constitution revision process constitute an 
expression of Luxembourg’s commitment to European integration and its longstanding 
deference to international law.  
 
3.1.3 Article 49bis, which provides for the transfer of powers to international institutions only 
temporarily, is to be modified in the course of the current revision procedure. 
 
3.1.4 In the Expert’s view, the relevant constitutional provision, 49bis, regarding the 
temporary limits of the delegation of powers to international institutions, indeed requires 
amendment. However, there seems to be a consensus not to include any other limits to such 
delegation. Furthermore, an explicit reference to the status of international law vis-à-vis the 
national legal order may also be in order. However, the constitutional revision procedure is 
still ongoing and the protection of constitutional rights is included in the discussions.  
 
3.2 The position of international law in national law 
 
3.2.1 In the Constitution, there is no express reference to the legal status of international 
treaties in domestic law. However, as discussed in Sect. 1.3.1, the Conseil d’État as well as 
the Cour de cassation have firmly confirmed that in the case of conflict between a rule of 
domestic law and a rule of international law that has direct effect in the domestic legal order, 
the rule of the international treaty shall prevail.93 
 Regarding Art. 37 of the Constitution, there is jurisprudence clarifying the following 
issues: types of international treaties, procedure for the promulgation of international treaties, 
interpretation and suspension of international treaties, the conflict between an international 
treaty and national law and the power of the Grand Duke to delegate his authority to conclude 
international treaties.  
 Regarding types of international treaties, in 1960 the Cour de Cassation decided that the 
procedure used for the conclusion of an international treaty does not affect the determination 
of its legal status domestically, because the procedure, the type of obligations and even the 
terminology used for a treaty are determined on the international level by diplomatic means. 
                                                
90 Doc. parl. No. 4634/1, p. 1.  
91 Rapport de la commission des Institutions et de la Revision constitutionnelle du 6 juillet 2000, doc. parl. No. 
4634/2. 
92 Original French text: ‘Art. 107 Les dispositions de la Constitution ne font pas obstacle aux obligations 
découlant du Statut de la Cour pénale internationale.’  
93 Conseil d’Etat, 28 July 1951, Pasicrisie 15, p. 263. See also Cour de Cassation, 8 June 1950, Pasicrisie 15, p. 
41 and Cour de Cassation, 14 July 1954, Pasicrisie 16, p. 151.  
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Despite their diversity, all international treaties are equipped with the same binding effect in 
Luxembourg.94 Furthermore, the jurisprudence has confirmed that no specific form of 
international treaty is required for the regularity of an international instrument duly approved 
by law.95 
 Regarding the procedure, as early as in 1949 the national courts declared that international 
treaties are not enforceable or judiciable unless approved by Parliament and published in the 
Memorial.96 Interestingly, in 1889, the court in Luxembourg declared that international 
arrangements which have not been the subject of a published Act or of a general 
administrative measure, would not create any obligations for Luxembourgers.97 
 
3.2.2 The traditional distinction between monist and dualistic approaches to international law 
is outdated. When researching the issue of the interaction between the international and 
domestic legal orders, a strictly dualistic approach is not effective in capturing the perplexity 
of the different normative structures set in place for the protection of fundamental rights or 
the different levels of international obligations of states. Even using the term ‘different legal 
orders’ has a dualistic connotation and refers to a more enclosed system of hierarchical legal 
orders. Such an enclosed system of hierarchical legal orders, however, does not correspond to 
reality, given the international protection of human rights regime and the case law of both the 
Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights.   
 No legal commentary exists on the applicability of monism and dualism in Luxembourg. 
Luxembourgish institutions and courts have adopted a progressive view on the position of 
international law in the national legal order, following a somewhat monistic approach, should 
this term still be considered relevant.  
 
3.3 Democratic control 
 
3.3.1 a) As regards constitutional rules on parliamentary involvement with regard to the 
initial negotiations and ratification of international treaties, the Chambre is not involved in 
the negotiation of treaties but intervenes prior to ratification. The approval of an international 
treaty by the Luxembourgish legislator and the subsequent publication of the approving Act 
are indeed the necessary conditions that have to be fulfilled so that the international treaty can 
be ratified internationally98 and so that it can produce domestic legal effects99.   
 An international treaty is approved by a legislative act (see Art. 37 of the Constitution) and 
follows the same rules as approval of an Act of Parliament dealing with domestic affairs 
(except for treaties conferring the execution of legislative, executive or judicial powers 
temporarily to an international body; in such case the special majority requirements under 
Art. 114(2) of the Constitution related to constitutional amendments are to be followed). The 
legislative act is a purely formal measure by which the national legislator approves the treaty 
and possible reservations to the treaty.100 Due to the requirements related to the publication of 
Acts approving international treaties, it seems that simplified (executive) international 
agreements cannot produce legally binding domestic effects (unless submitted to the 
publication procedure).101 While the legislature can block the ratification of an international 
                                                
94 Cour, 3 December 1960, Pasicrisie 18, p. 223.  
95 Cour de Cassation, 21 Décembre 1961, Pasicrisie 18, p. 424. 
96 Trib.Lux., 21 December 1949, Pasicrisie 15, 25.  
97 Cour, 2 August 1889, Pasicrisie 3, p. 123.  
98 Kinsch 2010, pp. 403–404. 
99 Trib. Lux., 21 December 1949, Pas. 15, p. 25. 
100 Kinsch 2010, p. 402. 
101 Ibid., p. 403. 
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treaty by not approving it, legislative approval does not oblige the executive power to 
proceed with the ratification on the international plane.  
 
 b) Under the Constitution, and apart from the EU-specific rules on the involvement of 
national parliaments based on the principle of subsidiarity (see Sect. 1.4.1), the Chambre is 
not endowed with any post-ratification monitoring/implementation powers as regards 
international treaties that have been ratified by Luxembourg (and internally approved and 
published). However, as a matter of practice, the Luxembourgish legislator is present through 
its delegations within various international and European fora, such as NATO, Benelux and 
the Interparliamentary Conference on Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common 
Security and Defence Policy. 
 
3.3.2 As noted in Sect. 1.4.2 above, referendums in Luxembourg have remained rare and 
have only been used three times to date (February 2015), including in 1919 on the economic 
union to be established with France or Belgium. For EU-related referendums, see Sect. 1.4.2.  
 No constitutional ban applies to referendums concerning international treaties. 
 
3.4 Judicial review 
 
3.4.1 The relationship between domestic Luxembourgish law and international law is 
determined by a strong deference to international law. The best illustration of this approach is 
Art. 95ter(2) of the Constitution that explicitly prohibits the constitutional review of Acts of 
Parliament approving international treaties by the Constitutional Court. To the Expert’s 
knowledge, the domestic courts have not challenged international law norms in order to 
protect domestic legal standards. However, the domestic tribunals are likely to insist on the 
requirement that only international treaties that have been published as required can produce 
legal effects in the domestic legal system. Also, the Luxembourgish tribunals have engaged 
in the analysis of the direct applicability of specific international treaties referred to in cases 
pending before them. This analysis has been flawed with some inconsistency. Legal scholars 
have referred, in this respect, to the evolution of the stance taken by the Luxembourgish Cour 
de cassation (as well as by lower domestic courts) on the direct applicability of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.102 
 
3.5 The social welfare dimension of the Constitution 
 
3.5.1 To the Expert’s knowledge, the above concerns have not been translated into a 
significant constitutional discourse. 
 
3.6 Constitutional rights and values in selected areas of global governance 
 
3.6.1 As was discussed in greater detail in Sect. 2.3.5.1, the Conseil d’État has raised some 
constitutional concerns regarding the EAWFD, which does not allow for refusal to execute a 
warrant where the offence is of political nature.103 However, both the Act of 20 June 2001 on 
extradition and the European Convention on Extradition (Arts. 3(1) and (2)) distinguish 
requests for extradition which are related to political offences from extradition requests which 
pursue a political goal. In the context of the EAWFD and its relation to other international 
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law instruments, the Conseil d’État has underlined that it may seem surprising at first that a 
framework decision based on Art.3 4 TEU provides for rules which substitute rules resulting 
from Member States’ international treaties elaborated within the framework of the Council of 
Europe, such as the European Convention on Extradition and the Additional Protocols and 
the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. Regarding the European 
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Luxembourg has not made any reservation to 
its obligation to extradite a person even when the relevant offence may be of political nature. 
Article 5 of the Convention against Terrorism provides that it shall not be interpreted ‘as 
imposing an obligation to extradite if the requested State has substantial grounds for 
believing that the request for extradition for an offence mentioned in Article 1 or 2 has been 
made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race, religion, 
nationality or political opinion, or that that person's position may be prejudiced for any of 
these reasons’. However, according to the Conseil d’État, Luxembourg does not accept or 
apply broadly the principle laid down in Art. 5 of this Convention. A similar approach is to 
be expected by Luxembourg regarding any refusal to execute a warrant if the offence for 
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